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The role of atlases has always been to bring faraway 
lands closer to people. Those curious of the world and 
the nature of remote countries were the ones to reach 
for the atlases. European Atlas of Democratic Deﬁ cit is 
to play the same role. Its function is to present the chal-
lenges faced by particular EU countries and communities. 
Also such challenges that are not obvious and such that 
are not covered in the media for they are too complex 
or too “ typical” of a single country. The role of the Atlas 
is to present such topics, even if niche, to the readers 
from all over Europe. The Atlas is supposed to become 
a source of knowledge about internal problems each 
country is struggling with, including some diffi  culties we 
know nothing about because they are never covered in the 
press or on the news online for they are not hot enough 
to att ract a large number of readers. But aft er all those 
challenges are essential pieces of the complicated puzzle 
called the European Union and without them, no picture 
is complete and no key  reform will be possible.
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Democratic deficit in Europe — 
Is it indeed the main issue?
The annual State of the Union Address of the President of the 
European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker of 13 September 2017 
was a good opportunity to reflect upon the problem of democratic 
deficit in the European Union (EU). The usual problems discussed in 
the framework of democratic deficit basically refer to the question 
of legitimacy of the EU governance. They touch upon wide powers 
of the EU Council, the fact that the Council of Ministers that adopts 
laws consist of ministers who have not necessarily been elected on 
the national level, the fact that the EU president and the President 
of the European Commission are unelected officials, and the prob-
lem of a low voter turnout at European Parliament elections (which 
was 42,61% at the 2014 elections). The latter is believed to be a result 
of the low level of acceptance of the EU by the European citizens.
The Gap
On the conceptual level, the challenges to the legitimacy of the EU 
governance are posed by the lack of representativeness of the EU 
citizens, failure to make the EU more accessible, and insufficient 
accountability of the EU institutions. The problem of the “structural 
democratic deficit” within the EU has also been pointed out by many, 
including the German Constitutional Court.
In the past, some of these problems have been addressed. For 
example, the role of the European Parliament has been strength-
ened vis-à-vis the Council and new citizen participation tools have 
been added to the EU governance structures, such as the right to 
petition and more recent rights to European citizens’ initiative.
While formally these tools provide for exchange between the 
European institutions and European citizens, the gap seems to 
be widening between the values of some segments of European 
societies on the one hand, and the EU values reflected as such on 
the EU level. Examples of such would be: values enshrined in the EU 
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treaties, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and those in preambles 
of various directives, regulations and other sources of EU law (such 
as fundamental rights, non-discrimination, equality, transparency 
and similar). Namely, it is becoming very obvious that there are por-
tions of the European populations that do not seem to accept these 
values anymore. For instance, many people in Europe do not recog-
nize universality of human rights of people who are not EU citizens, 
or even of citizens of other EU member states. Also, the right to free 
movement of EU citizens within the EU territory, which has been 
gaining recognition since the adoption of the Citizens Directive in 
2004, is now losing importance due to accusations that EU citizens 
moving from new member states to the old member states are only 
“jobseekers”, “welfare shoppers”, and hence are undesirable.
Further, nationalistic and racist sentiments within the EU socie-
ties are gaining significant prominence. The openly racist party 
Golden Dawn has been sitting in the Greek parliament since 2012. 
In 2017, the German parliamentary elections brought a shocking 
success to Alternative for Germany (AfD) that aggressively defends 
racist, anti-immigrant, and anti-refugee positions; this means that 
such positions will be officially represented in the German parlia-
ment for the first time after the Second World War. While Marine 
Le Pen has been defeated at the presidential elections in France in 
2017, her party Front National remains a strong political actor pursu-
ing a comparably nationalistic programme. The situation is similar 
in various other EU member states (e.g. Austria, the Netherlands, 
Finland, Slovenia) where nationalistic politics is not the winning op-
tion yet, but it enjoys a strong support of the local population.
Yet in other parts of Europe, most prominently in Poland and 
Hungary, similar, but slightly different adverse trends are on the rise. 
Along with strong anti-refugee sentiments additional illiberal trends 
are notable. They aim towards closed societies governed by strong 
central authoritarian governments which are interested in leaving 
only limited room for democratic oversight and judicial control. 
These governments are heavily criticized by the EU institutions for 
their methods of governance, due to their impediments for democ-
racy and the rule of law.
At the same time, the trust of the EU citizens into the EU institu-
tions is on decline. According to the Standard Eurobarometer opin-
ion poll of 2016, only one third (33%) of Europeans trust the European 
Union, which is an extremely low share. Now, the question is: what if 
we tried to bring the EU even closer to its citizens? How would the 
EU have to change in order for this to happen?
6 — 7
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Identifying Identity
The fact is: we might not like the result. First of all, the often pro-
gressive-thinking EU institutions might not identify with what its 
citizens would like them to become. Further, EU citizens might not 
agree among themselves on how the EU should develop in the future. 
For instance, those that are more progressive already criticize the 
EU for not being sufficiently bold in proactively addressing migration 
challenges. They might also criticize the EU for its lack of action 
in cases of fundamental rights violations by the EU member states. 
Others criticize the EU for being too lenient towards migration, 
taking the risk of losing its “European identity”, whatever this might 
be. These voices demand even more closure of external and internal 
borders, more return, less immigration, and lower asylum recognition 
rates. Yet again, some want more democracy, transparency, and 
more accountability of the EU institutions. Others feel that there is 
a need for leaders who are more decisive, have stronger personali-
ties, and would represent father figures to the European nations.
Next, the West might want something completely different than 
the East. The already significant economic and political differences 
between the two poles also cause different expectations from 
both, the EU, as well as from other member states. Taking all these 
differences into account it seems that Juncker’s plan, evident from 
the State of the Union Address of 2017, to further consolidate the 
EU, seems just right. In this process, reaffirmation of EU’s legitimacy 
and bringing it closer to the citizens would also be much needed. 
Consultations with citizens that Juncker (and before him the French 
president Macron) mentioned on several occasions would be more 
than appropriate in this process. Not only that they have to take 
place nationally, they have to be held locally. Not just in bigger cities, 
but also in towns and villages.
Namely, the EU is splitting into, if we resort to a bit of simplifi-
cation, two universes — one consisting of societies profiting from 
EU membership, economic growth, scientific and technological de-
velopment, and multicultural experiences offered by EU cities and 
another one composed of societies that are economically deprived, 
do not feel that their opinions are heard, and feel threatened by fast 
globalization and constant acceleration of mobility of people and in-
formation. It is not surprising that closing down into smaller circles, 
behind the seeming protection of the national borders, might seem 
as a good idea in these circumstances. Hence, new links between 
the two universes have to be established, and this has to be done 
both bottom-up and top-down. While there is definitely the need for 
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the societies to be aware of this problem and organize locally, there 
is also a need for the EU to know about these parallel universes 
and act accordingly. If these problems are not addressed, the gap 
between the two universes will widen. In such circumstances further 
decomposition of the EU might become the real threat.
Two Universes
These issues are strongly visible in our daily lives. In our work on 
issues such as fundamental rights, the rule of law, and migration, 
we meet groups that seem to be coming from a completely differ-
ent place, as they might for instance care much more for religion, 
tradition, patriotism, or national identity. This is not a problem by 
itself. The problem is if the two universes have nothing in common 
anymore, as they might despise each other and be not willing to lis-
ten to each other anymore. The political leaders should not overlook 
this. Furthermore, it is extremely short sighted for political leaders 
to abuse this gap by inciting some groups against others. They 
should be making sure to promote the EU values on the ground and 
at the same time to transfer the messages of the local populations 
to the EU level, so that the EU institutions remain aware of the local 
problems and opinions.
The cacophony of expectations, values, and ideas of how our 
European societies should look like further contribute to the 
existing problems of the European democratic deficit. It is difficult 
to address the institutional challenges, especially in a situation 
where the existing institutional structures are under threat of falling 
apart — just think of Brexit, the Greek financial crisis, or the possibil-
ity of triggering of Article 7.
In this situation, careful approaches aiming at further consolida-
tion of the EU would be an appropriate way forward. Bold moves 
might threaten the persistence of the already fragile system which 
does not have a very strong popular support. At the same time, 
strong condemnations of the rise of racism and nationalism are most 
needed. After all, there is the need to remember why the European 
project has been initiated in the first place — to prevent future wars 
in Europe, alongside the aim of ensuring prosperity for Europe as a 
whole. These two goals have to retain the primary importance. Main-
taining the EU and reforming it in small steps towards greater ac-
countability and accessibility, including new member states to ensure 
further cohesion in wider Europe, while at the same time continuing 
to address inequality, racism, and nationalism are the pathways that 
should be followed for the EU to avoid less desirable scenarios.
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Weimar Scenario?
In Italy the gap between the people and the politicians is deepen-
ing and widening. The people perceive politicians as the French 
aristocracy was perceived just before the 1789 revolution. There are 
many reasons for this, some actual and based on facts, and some 
based on simple feelings; the latter can be right or wrong but still, 
they exist.
The piggish law
The current Parliament was elected by a law — the so called Itali-
cum — ruled partially unconstitutionally by the Corte Costituzionale 
in 2014. Actually, in 2017 there is still no new electoral law to replace 
the Italicum. Italicum replaced in turn an even worse law called 
Porcellum: the piggish thing in Latin. What was common to those 
two laws was the fact that the voters could not choose a candidate 
but only a Party’s list.
From 1994 to 2001, the Italians voted by virtue of a law based 
on a first pass the post system for the 75% of the seats, and they 
liked it. But the first pass the post system for the Italian politicians 
had a huge defect: it clearly states the winner and the loser. So the 
politicians devoted all their efforts to change that annoying circum-
stance by building up two laws that could never grant a stable 
majority in the Parliament.
In whole Europe a coalition is made by the bigger party that 
leads the way. In Italy the smaller the better — as long as the Lillipu-
tian party has enough seats to guarantee the majority. Furthermore, 
some MPs are inventing new parliamentary groups and creating 
new parties never submitted to the popular vote. The foolish elec-
toral law system has had consequences on party’s discipline. In Feb-
ruary 2017, according to Il Giornale, about 400 MPs, on a grand total 
of 945 elected MPs (Camera and Senato), switched from one party 
to another. And now, October 2017 just before the elections and 
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during the last five months of their term, Italian politicians are trying 
to approve a new electoral law, ignoring and by-passing the opinion 
of the Constitutional Court. At the same time, the Government is try-
ing to pass a new Citizenship law to give citizenship to new groups 
of people. Or to new groups of potential voters... — as many Italians 
believe. People suspect they want to create new citizens to have 
their votes. The suspicion could be groundless but many Italians are 
wary of politicians.
In this quagmire three Prime Ministers have been changed: 
Gianni Letta, Matteo Renzi, and Paolo Gentiloni; the President of the 
Republic has been re-elected, that had never happened before in the 
republican history, and a constitutional referendum has been held.
Looking for the good guy
Three Governments in five years is a not a bad result for Italy, but 
Renzi was not an MP when he became Prime Minister — he was 
the mayor of Florence. The Constitution does not forbid for no-MP 
to become Prime Minister, but this had happened only two times: 
in the case of Carlo Azeglio Ciampi and Lamberto Dini. Matteo Renzi 
was the third non-elected premier, but his election reinforced the 
idea of a non-voted man in charge of the government.
The Constitution does not explicitly forbid the re-election of 
a President of the Republic either, but the constitutional conventions 
have always deplored the re-election of the Chief of the State, for 
the length of the presidential term of office of seven years. Despite 
this, Giorgio Napolitano was re-elected President of the Republic by 
a newly elected Parliament. In doing so the Italian politicians admit-
ted that they had no credible person to stand for an office represent-
ing “the unity of the nation.” The Parliament was elected with the 
unconstitutional Italicum, and Giorgio Napolitano was not a beloved 
president like Sandro Pertini or respected like Carlo Azeglio Ciampi. 
He was an old communist apparatchik, who served as the Minister 
of Interior and as the Speaker of the Camera dei Deputati.
Last but not least, there is the issue of the constitutional 
referendum. Matteo Renzi tried to change the Constitution and 
his proposed reform was voted by the same Parliament elected 
with the same unconstitutional Italicum. The Italian Constitution 
provides for a referendum after two parliamentary votes in the 
case of constitutional reforms. It does not matter if Mr. Renzi’s 
constitutional reform was really needed as he said — actually it was 
not at all — the successive referendum outcomes recorded about 
60% of the voters against the reform. The result doomed both the 
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constitutional reform and Matteo Renzi. Actually in the night of the 
defeat Matteo Renzi promised on TV he would retire from politics; 
currently he is still the Secretary of the Democratic Party, the 
party’s candidate running for the office of Prime Minister.
The lack of credibility of politicians in Italy is underlined by the 
growing electoral absenteeism (see the graph).
To these political and constitutional facts we must add the 
shocking persistence of the corruption, the high salaries paid to the 
politicians, and their incompetence. A gag said that there are more 
graduates in the kitchen of a fast food than in the government of the 
Republic. Quite true, in fact several Key-Ministers have no university 
degree: the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Public Health, and 
the Minister of Labour. The Minister of the Instruction, University 
and Scientific Research deserves a separate discussion, as she did 
not even attend a five-year high school course. She has a middle 
school diploma, and for all of her life she was a trade unionist; 
a textile trade unionist.
This unsettling panorama is common to all political parties both 
right and left; and both right and left are happily sawing off the 
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branch on which they sit blaming the EU for any unpopular measure. 
Meanwhile, they forget true liberal measures in the economy. 
Furthermore, like ostriches the Italian politicians are burying their 
heads in the sand and refuse to address the growing number of poor 
people and call the Movimento 5 Stelle fascist or populist. With all its 
huge defects, the Movimento will be remembered by the future his-
torians as the last ditch against a resurgent Italian fascism. Although 
the Movimento is often accused of being a populist party with strong 
anti-EU feelings, it has hitherto demonstrated to be faithful to De-
mocracy and Constitution. It has also brought common people closer 
to politics by appealing to them and encouraging them to participate 
in the elections. Obviously, the Movimento is not all sunshine and 
rainbows, but certainly it currently drew the votes of the disgruntled, 
preventing them from going to the far-right parties.
To conclude, the frightening flaw of the Italian politicians is the 
idea that they are brilliant and they rule by sort of a divine right 
over an illiterate crowd which must be guided for its own good even 
when not convinced if it is for the good. The democracy in Italy is 
near to commit suicide.
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The Greatest Test
Unwritten Constitution
Brexit is the biggest challenge to British democracy this year and 
may well prove to be the greatest test that the UK has faced since 
the Second World War.
It is hard for many foreign people to believe it but the UK has 
an unwritten or ‘uncodified’ constitution. It is the only country in the 
world that does not have one single document to point to, so that 
people can say that is Britain’s fundamental law and that is the way 
things should be done there.
This is because the British constitution has evolved piecemeal 
since the Magna Carta was signed on 15 June 1215. The UK constitu-
tion consists of some written documents — such as the Magna 
Carta — but also many customs, conventions, usages, precedents 
and a variety of legal instruments that have been built up and been 
kept over centuries. The beauty of this way of doing things is that it 
has given the country a great deal of stability for a very long time.
However, Brexit is a test for British democracy and the country’s 
constitution for a whole host of reasons. One of the main reasons 
Brexiteers wanted the UK to leave the European Union was because 
of the way in which European Court of Justice rulings had to be 
accepted almost automatically by British courts. In the Brexiteers’ 
view this meant that Britain was losing its sovereignty and eventu-
ally the country would have a kind of written constitution decided 
at a European level.
Many British intellectuals felt that was ‘undemocratic’ because, 
of course, the judges are unelected (this position was reinforced by 
the fact that the European commissioners are not elected either 
despite their immense power).
But I think one of the biggest problems that Brexit has posed 
for the British constitution is the way in which it was decided: 
through a referendum. The UK has a parliamentary democratic 
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tradition stretching back hundreds of years. There are 650 MPs who 
represent around 92,000 people each. The tradition is that all major 
matters are decided by MPs without recourse to a plebiscite. They 
are the representatives of the people and are meant to use their 
best judgement and their conscience to decide what is right.
This does not mean to say there have never been referendums in 
Britain before. In 1975, one took place on whether we should remain 
part of the European Economic Community, the forerunner to the 
EU (that time round the answer was ‘yes’). But there was an 18-year 
gap between 1979 and 1997 when none took place.
In my opinion, Tony Blair has a lot to answer for in terms of creat-
ing many of the challenges that the UK — and the world — faces today 
but to that long list should be added the re-introduction of referen-
dums. His government held them on Scottish and Welsh devolution 
in 1997 and they were then continued by the Conservative/Liberal 
Democrat administration of David Cameron (on electoral reform 
in 2011, Scottish independence in 2014, and then Brexit in 2016).
These plebiscites have undermined the parliamentary system that 
prevailed for centuries in the UK — what is the point of having elected 
representatives if you are going to have referendums regularly?
They also tend to be highly divisive and have made the British 
polity more fractious. Families were divided over Scottish independ-
ence and long-term friendships destroyed over Brexit. The motives 
of the man who murdered the Labour MP Jo Cox last year are not 
clear but it is true that the UK was living through a period of highly 
charged emotions in the run-up to the EU referendum.
The referendum questions tend to be ‘binary’, ‘yes’ or ‘no’. And life 
is not always that black and white. So, I would argue strongly that 
Britain must not hold any more referendums. They are not good for 
British democracy.
And last year’s Brexit referendum — which took place on 
23 June — really ran a coach and horses through the British con-
stitution. Some 52% of voters plumped to leave the EU while 48% 
opted to remain.
It has proved to be utterly divisive for the British people and 
probably the UK political system is now more fragmented than at any 
time since the start of the Second World War when a great debate 
took place about ‘appeasement’ towards the Nazis under Neville 
Chamberlain or a more aggressive stance under Winston Churchill.
To be fair to Cameron, he would argue that he had no option but 
to call the 2016 referendum, that EU membership is fundamental 
and that the British people must decide once and for all whether 
14 — 15
United Kingdom #brexit
they want to be members. Many people on the Left argue that 
Cameron held it as a way of dealing with rowdy Brexiteers in the 
Conservative Party; it was a way of managing the Thatcherite wing 
of the party. There is probably some truth to that.
Cameron almost definitely thought that the Remain side would 
win the referendum and it is unlikely that he would have called it if 
he knew the Brexiteers would triumph (it is a moot point whether he 
now rues having called it).
‘Why don’t we just leave?’
Brexit divided Britain right down the middle. Some newspapers 
have run with stories this year saying the Queen did not understand 
why ‘we don’t just leave’ (the monarchy is meant to be strictly neu-
tral on all political matters, according to constitutional convention).
But it is clear that most former British prime ministers, including 
Gordon Brown, Tony Blair, and Sir John Major wanted us to remain 
members. And the vast majority of the people who run Britain — 
referred to almost pejoratively as the Establishment — wanted 
us to stay. These include government ministers, top judges, top 
civil servants, chief executives of FTSE 100 companies, university 
chancellors, leading newspaper columnists, and the senior brass 
at the Bank of England.
There were notable exceptions, of course, who supported Brexit. 
They include Sir Mervyn King, a former governor of the Bank of 
England; Sir James Dyson, the entrepreneur behind Dyson vacuum 
cleaners; Charles Moore, a former editor of the Daily Telegraph; and 
Nigel Lawson, a former British chancellor.
However, the referendum outcome is posing special challenges 
for every branch of British government and it is true that Brexit is 
a historic moment that will shape the UK — and Europe — for the 
next 50 years, at least.
The referendum result is not legally binding. It is only advisory 
for parliamentary lawmakers but it would be a brave leader who 
ignored it. Both Primer Minister Theresa May and Labour leader 
 Jeremy Corbyn have said they accept the outcome (though the 
latter is now speaking with a forked tongue probably to try to 
maximise his vote share).
I believe that now it has been called it is virtually impossible for 
politicians to ignore the ‘will of the people’. It would be very arrogant 
of the political class to turn round to voters and say, “I am sorry, 
guys, we know we live in a democracy but you have just not thought 
this one through, we know better than you”.
Jason Mitchell The Greatest Test
If politicians tried that it could result in even greater popular 
rebellion, something that Nigel Farage, the former UKIP leader, is al-
ready threatening because he believes Brexit is being watered down.
However, it is certain that both the country’s main political par-
ties — the Conservatives and Labour — are utterly divided over Brexit.
Theresa May is a Remainer but is the head of a government that 
has committed itself to Brexit.
This is a contradiction that has proved extremely hard for her 
to get around at a personal level. It seems that how ever much she 
wants to talk up Brexit, in her heart of hearts she really thinks the 
whole thing is a bad idea (at a Goldman Sachs event before the 
referendum she described Brexit as ‘crazy’).
The Opposite Problem
On the other hand, Corbyn seems to have the opposite problem. 
He ran a lukewarm campaign in favour of EU membership but many 
people suspect that deep down he would like Britain to leave the 
Union so that he can pursue ‘socialism in one country’ in the UK.
Traditionally, the British Hard Left — he is a prominent member — 
has been against EU membership because the European Commis-
sion could enforce a competitions policy in the country that would 
stop the state ownership of key industries (Corbyn wants to take the 
railways, the Royal Mail and energy utilities back into state hands).
In my view, this has now become one of the biggest reasons in 
favour of us remaining a full member of the EU. The Brexit outcome 
has given a ‘window of opportunity’ to a socialist party to take power 
that would pose a threat to the tenets of liberal democracy. This 
unwelcome result has come about because many young people who 
supported Remain voted against the Conservatives at the General 
Election on 8 June. In a spasm of defiance or as a kind of protest 
vote, they opted for Corbyn at the election (despite him almost 
definitely being in favour of withdrawal deep down).
Many people on the continent do not realise just how left wing 
the Labour Party has become. John McDonnell –the shadow chan-
cellor who admits to liking Karl Marx — believes in street action as 
well as parliamentary democracy. He also advocated the arbitrary 
seizure of property following the Grenfell Tower catastrophe in Lon-
don in June. The current leadership of the Labour Party has a strong 
nexus with the regime that runs Venezuela.
And, so, this is one of the great challenges that Brexit has thrown 
up: how to come up with a good deal on our withdrawal at the same 
time as seeing off a socialist threat.
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The Liberal Democrats are the only major national political 
party that fought the General Election on the basis of us remaining 
part of the EU (they wanted a second referendum to take place). 
They did badly!
Yet, Theresa May’s lack of passion and of charisma was amply 
demonstrated at the General Election. She was not prepared to have 
a live television debate with Corbyn and most commentators think 
that the Tories put in their worst election performance ever. She was 
so certain that she would win handsomely that she even changed 
the law so that the election could be held (in 2011, the British parlia-
ment had passed a Fixed-term Parliaments Act which meant that 
the next British election was not necessary until 7 May 2020).
In the end, Corbyn did much better than most commentators 
expected. The Conservatives lost 13 seats and Labour gained 30, 
meaning May lost her overall majority in the House of Commons 
(the Conservatives now have a total of 316 and Labour 262). She had 
to enter into a coalition with the dreaded Democratic Unionist Party 
in Northern Ireland — which has ten seats — to remain in power 
(dreaded because it is seen as a highly reactionary party — its  
against gay marriage, for example).
The Liberal Democrats won only 12 seats at the General Election 
(up by three since the 2015 General Election) and the Scottish 
National Party took 35 (down by 19 from the 2015 General Election).
Overall, this is an extraordinary election outcome and one that 
no one was expecting. One Conservative wag said that May is the 
least successful PM since Lord North who lost the United States 
for Britain in September 1783!
And, so, the UK has one of the weakest governments since the 
Second World War at one of its most vulnerable periods. It faces an 
Islamic terrorist threat; must chart a new political course for itself 
outside the European Union; and has an opposition political party 
that wants to undertake a socialist transformation of the country.
It is not yet totally clear how Britain will navigate these choppy 
waters but I am optimistic that it will manage to do so.
It is now becoming more and more evident that the UK will 
not have a clean break from the EU. Within the last month, 
the  Labour Party has changed its position on Brexit, from fully 
supporting it to now saying that the UK should remain a member 
of the single market.
I think it has done this because it wants to maintain the 
support of young Remain voters. The Labour Party has been 
extraordinarily divided over Brexit. Many of its MPs represent 
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metropolitan constituencies — including Corbyn in Islington in 
London — where the populations are strongly in favour of the EU. 
But many of Labour’s traditional working class Northern seats are 
heavily pro-Brexit (these communities tend to think that the mass 
immigration that the UK has witnessed during the past decade has 
pushed up property prices and rents and has made the competition 
for jobs more intense).
The Labour Party wants the continuing support of both groups 
but by the time it has any chance of coming into power — probably 
from some time after 2019 — Brexit would have already happened 
and the debate would have moved on (clever Labour strategists 
such as Seamus Milne know this which is why the party is currently 
trying to be all things to all people).
The great challenge for British democracy this year and next is 
getting the right kind of Brexit deal.
The complexities of the Brexit process were highlighted at the 
start of the year when the British Supreme Court had to make 
a decision on whether Parliament should have a vote on triggering 
Article 50. This is the clause of the 1992 Treaty on European Union 
that sets out the process by which member states may withdraw 
from the union. Once invoked, the leaving member and the EU have 
two years in which to negotiate the terms of withdrawal.
Theresa May’s government fought very hard to try to ensure 
that Parliament never had a final say on triggering Article 50 
(they argued that is was a decision for the executive branch only). 
But this is another indication of how Brexit has proved to be a test 
for British democracy.
Checks and balances should be at the heart of any liberal demo-
cratic system but in this case the executive branch of government 
did not want the legislative wing to have a final say over a matter 
fundamental to the UK’s future. This was a ludicrous posture for the 
government to take, given the British parliamentary tradition (the 
House of Commons is supposed to be the Mother of Parliaments, 
after all). It is little wonder that the Supreme Court sided with Parlia-
ment over this vital question.
In the end, the government invoked Article 50 on 31 March this 
year, following a vote in the House of Commons. This started the 
two-year countdown for Britain’s withdrawal.
Theresa May has also now indicated that MPs will have the 
opportunity to vote on the final Brexit package negotiated by the 
government and the European Union. Of course, the legislatures of 
the other 27 members of the EU will also have to agree with the deal.
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Establishment Fought Back
One of the most interesting aspects of the Brexit process is 
how the country’s Establishment has fought back against a full 
withdrawal from the EU. In September in Florence, Theresa May 
made a keynote speech in which she said that the UK would have 
a two-year transitional period following the country’s withdrawal 
in March 2019.
Obviously, the term Establishment is amorphous but most peo-
ple that make it up are terrified that the UK will leave the EU without 
some kind of deal — this is the so-called ‘hard’ Brexit that they claim 
amounts to ‘falling off a cliff’. Earlier this year, Theresa May indicated 
that this was an option for Britain — that we would just leave and 
operate under WTO rules. At the time, commentators thought this 
was only a negotiating tactic.
However, since the General Election outcome, managing the 
Cabinet of the British government has become a balancing act for 
the PM. Every morning she wakes up and faces a new tightrope 
to walk. The chancellor Philip Hammond is very much in favour 
of Remain and is the main Cabinet cheerleader of the Europhile 
wing of the Conservative Party (whose leaders include former Tory 
ministers Kenneth Clarke and Sir Michael Heseltine).
It is widely rumoured that May would have sacked Hammond if 
she had had an election triumph (he oversaw a shambolic Budget 
at the start of the year and the relationship between the two is said 
to be tense). But May is now so weak that she cannot easily get rid 
of him. Her parliamentary majority is so paper thin that she requires 
the support of Europhile Conservative MPs, such as Clarke but also 
Nicky Morgan and Anna Soubry.
Yet, May’s big problem is that she also needs the backing of 
Eurosceptic MPs, such as John Redwood and Jacob Rees-Mogg. 
These Brexit hardliners probably form the biggest cohesive bloc in 
her parliamentary party. In the Cabinet, they are mainly represented 
by the Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson and environment minister 
Michael Gove.
The tensions within the governing party are playing havoc with 
the British constitution. One of its vital components is ‘collective 
ministerial responsibility’, a constitutional convention in which 
 government ministers must publicly support all governmental deci-
sions made in Cabinet, even if they do not privately agree with them.
In July, Hammond tested this convention to its limits when he 
told the BBC Today radio programme that the EU may look similar 
to its current one for up to three years after Brexit, including free 
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movement, access to the single market and an inability to strike  
trade deals with other countries.
This was not the Cabinet’s agreed position and Hammond’s com-
ments infuriated Boris Johnson and Michael Gove.
However, in September, in a clear breach of ‘collective respon-
sibility’ Johnson wrote a long, upbeat article for the Daily Telegraph 
newspaper in which he said — among other things — that the UK 
should not have to pay to access the EU single market and that 
Britain should be able to strike its own free trade deals.
Its publication had not been cleared with May before hand 
and when she found out about it it is reported that she was livid 
(Johnson likes to paint himself as a kind of Churchillian figure and 
it is well known that he would love to have the top job).
In the end, the two patched matters up before May’s Florence 
speech but it is a sign of her own personal weakness that she had to 
invite Hammond, Johnson, and David Davies, the secretary of state 
for Exiting the EU, along to witness her deliver it.
It is not clear how long this show of unity will stand as the big-
gest Brexit battles are likely to be fought within the next few months.
What is evident that a departure from ‘collective ministerial 
responsibility’ sets a bad precedent for the smooth running of 
British government. It is something that Margaret Thatcher, 
for example, would never have tolerated, as it is immensely hard 
to be effective when there is government in-fighting. Furthermore, 
it looks shambolic and makes voters think that politicians are just in 
it for themselves (which is not always the case). It also improves the 
chance of Corbyn one day winning the keys to Number Ten.
The Labour Party is probably as divided as the Conservative 
Party over Brexit but the Tories are in power and it is much harder 
for it to cover up the divisions.
Yes, Prime Minister
For me, it is a spectacle in itself to see the British Establishment in 
action; there is no other show quite like it on the planet. Of course, 
this crowd of people feels that it runs Britain in some kind of Pla-
tonic sense. In other words, it is full of the ‘great and the good’, the 
‘experts’, who know better than the ‘little man’ or the ‘run-of-the-mill’ 
voter. Undoubtedly, the Establishment sees itself as a benign force, 
as a kind of patrician figure that will ensure that the status quo 
prevails and that the boat is not rocked too much.
The Establishment is a pretty homogenous lump. Its members 
are almost always white, male, privately educated, live in London 
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or the Home Counties, well-to-do and maybe Oxbridge educated. 
The Times or the FT are their newspapers of choice. Their favourite 
weekly magazine is the Economist (which prefers to style itself 
as a newspaper but it is not). They also listen to the BBC’s Today 
programme every day.
The Establishment has a kind of ‘group think’ and its current 
orthodoxy is, “we do not really want Brexit at all and, if we can stop it, 
great, but if we cannot stop it, it must be a ‘soft’ Brexit at any cost”.
It is fascinating how this group think evolves and why it exists 
in the first place. In my view, this has something to do with social 
class. The UK is a highly class divided society (mostly along private/
state school lines but also wealth). The upper classes tend to be 
very much in favour of Remain, though not always as Boris Johnson 
and Jacob Rees-Mogg both went to the UK’s top boarding school, 
Eton, for example. The lower classes tend to be in favour of Brexit. 
The middle classes are somewhere in between depending on many 
factors, including age, job, location, and background.
I would argue that this upper/lower class division has a lot to 
do with the economic advantages that the higher echelons have 
derived from Brexit. The single market led to more immigration 
into Britain that pushed up property prices. It also meant that 
businesses could employ Eastern Europeans who are seen by many 
UK-owned firms as harder working than the native working class. 
Many of these people also have second homes on the continent 
or part of their family lives there. But the class element manifests 
itself in another way: many Establishment members relate better to 
European elites than ordinary Britons.
Whatever the reason, there is no doubt that the Establishment 
has fought a successful rear guard action against a ‘hard’ Brexit. 
This raises important issues for the British constitution. One of 
the most influential people in Britain is the Cabinet Secretary, 
Sir Jeremy Heywood. His background is archetypal Establishment: 
boarding school and Oxbridge, followed by the London School 
of Economics.
He is the most senior civil servant in the UK and is the senior 
policy adviser to the PM and the Cabinet and, as the Cabinet 
Secretary, responsible to all Ministers for the smooth running of 
Cabinet government. According to the porous British constitution, 
the Cabinet Secretary is supposed to be strictly neutral about 
political matters. But in reality — like all the top brass in the civil 
service — Sir Jeremy is a Europhile and it is rumoured that he has 
been pushing strongly for a ‘soft’ Brexit.
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A famous TV sitcom used to exist in the UK called ‘Yes, Prime 
Minister’, in which a leading civil servant invariably agrees with the 
PM but secretly tries to change his mind or galvanise events in 
a certain direction. This is satire but Sir Jeremy undoubtedly holds 
a lot of sway. That can be a test for our democracy because Sir 
Jeremy is unelected and should always defer to elected Ministers.
Similarly, the most important department of state in Britain is 
the Treasury, in charge of economic matters. Again, this department 
has been very much against the Brexit process. It has been backed 
up by the UK’s Central Bank, called the Bank of England, whose 
Canadian governor Mark Carney spoke out against Brexit in pretty 
strong terms during the referendum campaign. In my view, he 
overstepped the mark and should have stuck to a strictly neutral 
position during the highly heated run up to the vote.
The Battle Royal
The key issues that divide the Conservative Brexiteers and the 
Remainers revolve around whether to accept any new EU rules or 
ECJ rulings during the transition period and whether to rule out any 
further payments to Brussels for single-market access when the 
transition ends. In fact, it is not clear whether it would be legally pos-
sible to implement ECJ rulings in the UK during the transition period.
The two sides are also divided over whether the final post-
transition deal would lead to Britain copying Brussels rules to 
ensure easy access to the single market.
Brexiteers want the trade deal already agreed by the European 
Union and Canada – known as Ceta — as a basis for the new 
bilateral arrangement after Brexit. This would enable the UK to 
make its own tariff-free trade deals around the world. The Ceta 
deal eliminates 98 per cent of all Canadian tariffs between the EU 
and Canada.
Brexit is such an enormous test for the Conservative Party — 
the world’s oldest political party dating back to 1834 — that it is 
possible that it will splinter into two. The battle royal within the party 
will centre around access to the single market.
Brexiteers insist that the government must put a stop to the 
freedom of movement of EU citizens and argue that this stance is 
not compatible with the single market but, as far as possible, Re-
mainers want access to the single market to continue. Their position 
pivots around London’s position as Europe’s preeminent financial 
centre and they are concerned that so-called financial ‘passporting’ 
will also disappear when the UK leaves.
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The issues can become highly emotive with some Remainers 
accusing Brexiteers of ‘racism’ or ‘xenopobia’. Meanwhile, Brexiteers 
describe Remainers as ‘stuck up’ and looking down on the ‘little 
people’ who voted to Leave.
The whole thing has become quite toxic, sadly, and it is true that 
a level of vitriol has been injected into the political blood of the 
country that could take a generation to cleanse. Britons have not 
been at each other’s throats in this way in a very long time.
The next 18 months are likely to be one of the greatest tests 
for British democracy and the constitution ever.
Even if a deal between the European Commission and the UK 
starts to take form, this must be approved in the House of Com-
mons. The Labour Party is now playing hard ball with the govern-
ment and it could well vote against this legislation. In which case, 
the Prime Minister will be heavily dependent on the DUP and will 
have to try to ensure that the Europhile Tories are on board.
Even if passed by the House of Commons, it needs House of 
Lords approval, as well. The Parliament Act of 1911 prevents the 
Lords from blocking a bill dealing with taxation and allows them to 
delay any other bill for a maximum of three sessions (reduced to two 
sessions in 1949), after which it becomes law over their objections.
The Lords has a total of 682 members, including 204 Tories, 195 
Labour peers, 96 Liberal Democrat and 144 crossbench (the latter do 
not take the whip from any one party). Many peers are Europhiles 
and it is conceivable that they will attempt to delay the Brexit bill — 
known as the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. They could make 
a lot of trouble for the government and it is possible that the whole 
thing could get messy. British tabloids tend to support Brexit and 
you can envisage headlines like, “The Lords blocks Brexit”.
The bill will pass through both Houses and only take effect the 
day that the UK leaves the EU.
All existing EU legislation will be copied across into domestic UK 
law to ensure a smooth transition on the day after Brexit. But large 
swathes of UK law ‘will no longer work’ on exit, for example, because 
they refer to EU institutions.
The total body of European law — dating back to 1958 — is known 
as the Acquis Communautaire and consist of about 80,000 items, 
covering everything from workers’ rights to environment and trade. 
And, so the, the British Parliament faces a monumental task in get-
ting all of this passed.
A lot of existing EU law will need to be ‘corrected’ as it transfers 
over to the British statute book. The government plans to carry this 
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out through the of use of what are known as ‘Henry VIII’ powers, 
after the Statute of Proclamations 1539 which gave that monarch 
the power to legislate by proclamation.
Between 800 to 1,000 ‘statutory instruments’ — legally-binding 
measures approved by Ministers but not by Parliament — will 
have to be passed. Already the Labour Party is claiming that 
Ministers have been handed ‘sweeping powers’ to make hasty, 
ill thought-out legislation.
The government has said the devolved administrations — in  
Scot land, Wales and Northern Ireland — will be asked to consent to 
the bill but this does not amount to a veto. It is clear that the Scot-
tish government would like a much bigger say in the Brexit process 
than it is having at the moment but ultimately Westminster rules 
supreme on this matter and it is unlikely to be given a greater role.
Clearly, Brexit is the biggest challenge facing British democracy 
since the Second World War. Handled well, it is possible that the 
country will discover a renewed sense of being and having its sense 
of nationhood reinvigorated. Only time will tell. 
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Cultural, Not Simply 
Institutional
Hungary may be a fine instance of the ‘third reverse wave’ of de-
mocratisation Samuel P. Huntington foresaw in his landmark book, 
The Third Wave. Since his 2010 election landslide victory, Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán has torpedoed the country’s democratic 
institutions. Today, Hungary does poorly on almost all of the usual 
markers of democracy: elections, ‘checks and balances,’ and 
fundamental freedoms.
These markers are not entirely adequate, however. Consider 
this: Hungary was a democracy on all these counts in 2009, and 
yet that was easily turned around in a matter of months. Certainly, 
the country’s democratic deficit runs deeper than flawed 
institutions, to the level of norms. For institutions do not oper-
ate in a vacuum; to be stable, they need roots in a democratic 
political culture.
Norms take longer than institutions to take root. Yet they are 
what democracy-builders need to be concerned with if they wish 
democracy to last.
Institutions undone
Fidesz has turned the institutions of democracy from checks on its 
power into the means of its power.
Hungary’s Constitutional Court, once considered to be among 
the most powerful in the world, now has a constrained jurisdiction 
and it is packed with Fidesz loyalists. It interprets the constitution 
unilaterally adopted by the Fidesz supermajority in spring 2011, 
after only a two-month debate in parliament, boycotted by all but 
extreme-right Jobbik.
What is true of the Constitutional Court is true of most 
independent institutions. The procuracy, the judicial supervisory 
body, the court of auditors, as well as the ombudsman’s office, 
to name a few, are all staffed by individuals with links to Fidesz. 
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With appointments typically lasting nine years, they would 
pose a significant threat to governability were Fidesz to lose 
in elections.
The opposition is weak and highly fragmented. It may well be 
subsumed in infighting: the very public horse-trading that came 
with negotiations about standing as a block in 2014 is gaining centre 
ground again ahead of the 2018 elections. The Socialists seem 
to have lost all growth potential as a dynamic new leader, László 
Botka, fights standpatter elements within the party. A variety of 
small parties hover around and under the 5% parliamentary thresh-
old. Jobbik, the largest opposition party, is trying to reposition itself 
as a popular movement, but is struggling with credibility issues.
Independent media are few and far between. The state 
broadcaster has been turned into a propaganda organisation, 
shamelessly parroting government communications, spiked with 
half-truths and complete fabrications. The biggest independent 
national daily was shut down in 2016; regional papers, large online 
news portals and TV channels have been bought up by business-
men with links to Fidesz. A supervisory authority staffed by Fidesz 
loyalists has the power to impose crippling fines at will — although 
this power has not yet been used to restrict the freedom of the few 
remaining independent outlets.
This immense imbalance is complemented by an electoral 
law crafted to favour Fidesz. One-round voting in individual con-
stituencies ensures that one strong party wins over a popular but 
fragmented opposition. The option of postal vote for Hungarians in 
the Carpathian Basin but not for those in Western Europe — a viola-
tion of the principle of universal suffrage — as well as redrawn 
electoral districts tilt the field further towards Fidesz. The National 
Electoral Commission, which oversees the elections, is controlled 
by the party. Elections may be free, therefore, but are not fair, 
as  observers of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe concluded. 1
Culturally inapposite
These attacks on democratic institutions would have been more 
difficult to carry out if the institutions had borne real legitimacy; 
if the norms and culture of democracy had been in place. Without 
solid civic engagement, voter participation, and more generally, 
an understanding of and attachment to democracy on the part 
of the people, Orbán did not have to face strong opposition to 
democratic backsliding.
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Measuring the penetration of democratic norms can be difficult, 
but voter participation is a useful marker. Turnout in Hungarian 
elections is low by European and average by regional standards. 
Since 2002, however, it has been in a slow but steady decline. This is 
likely a result of disillusion with democracy and market capitalism. 
Yet it also reflects the country’s poor performance in democratic 
education in the period since 1990.
The more highly voters regard political participation and the 
more open they are to civic activism and playing a stronger role in 
their communities, the better the chances of democracy to survive. 
Research by pollster TÁRKI shows that the biggest group of Hungar-
ian voters (38%) consider abiding by the law the most important 
component of being a ‘good citizen,’ suggesting that ‘law & order’ 
authoritarian instincts run high in Hungarian society. Considerably 
less (28%) think the most important condition of being a ‘good citizen’ 
is being politically active, which reflects democratic values. 2
These numbers speak of a society where the democratic norms of 
active citizenship and political participation have roots, but are over-
shadowed by authoritarian instincts. A democratic political culture 
would be needed to care for the norms so they are not further eroded.
Turnout in parliamentary elections 1990—2014
Source: OSCE
1  1  1    1  1
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However, Hungarian political culture encourages passivity, 
hampering any chance of democratic socialisation. Orbán’s 
rhetoric of war — against Brussels, against immigrants, against 
George Soros, etc. — is aimed at mobilising his own voters and 
rendering others inactive. The same is true of Fidesz’ exclusionary 
identity-building: in Orbán’s ‘system of national cooperation,’ only 
Fidesz-voters are considered a proper part of the nation. Much like 
the opposition’s, Fidesz’ speech is characterised by the extreme 
demonization of political opponents and the heavy use of ‘negative 
campaigning,’ mobilising voters against a certain person or idea, 
and inciting fear. Political speech, in general, is emotional rather 
than rational, thus forbidding dialogue with the other side. These 
are the building blocks of the culture of ressentiment that erodes 
the cohesion of society as a whole and that is unable to support 
democratic institutions.
Building a democracy to last
If democratic forces win an election, independent institutions will 
need to be re-built. The system of checks and balances, fundamental 
freedoms, and the electoral law will have to be considered matters 
28.0%
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Source: TÁRKI Omnibusz, June 2014
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of priority. Yet if better institutions are to last, some longer-term 
issues: those of norms and culture, will also have to be addressed.
Policy matters: democratic education, the state’s encourage-
ment of active citizenship, are important. The government can do 
a lot by limiting its own power and by communicating with citizens in 
an inclusive manner, for example. Civil society actors, who organise 
local communities better than the central government, are key for 
civic activism — the gateway to political participation — to flourish.
Politics may matter even more. Change can only start from those 
who shape it: they must bridge unbridgeable divides, overcome old 
dichotomies, leave behind the ressentiment, and establish a pluralist 
political discourse based on trust and decency. Only by articulating 
positive political identities and encouraging active citizenship can 
the inactive vote be galvanised — and since his regime depends on 
low participation, that is how Viktor Orbán can be toppled.
   
1 OSCE/ODIHR, Limited Election 
Observation Mission Final Report, Par-
liamentary Elections Hungary, 6 April 
2014. http://www.osce.org/odihr/elec-
tions/hungary/121098?download=true  
  
2 TÁRKI Omnibusz, June 2014. 
http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2015/ki-
tekint/20150216_joallampolgar.html
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The changing media landscape 
of Sweden and possible 
implications for politics
The focus of this essay is on the challenges facing the traditional 
media in Sweden — the “old” media as they are called by their 
critics — and how the changing media landscape and its financial 
difficulties affect both how and why the news media report what 
they do, and in consequence, how it affects politics.
By nature this essay will take a speculative perspective of future 
outlook, but one underpinned by both the rich trove of data acces-
sible and in part by my own observations during a decade’s work 
as a press officer and head of press in politics. Given the scope 
of this essay, it serves as a brief introduction to the topic.
Question of trust
First off, it might be interesting to know that inspite of having 
a xenophobic and populist party flying high in the polls (The Sweden 
Democrats at around 18 percentage points), there is no real “crisis 
of the elites” in Sweden as Ipsos (Global Trends 2017) identified as 
a salient trend across the Western world.
7 out of 10 Swedes trust scientists; four out of ten think it would 
be a good idea to let experts decide more (the highest number in 
18 years). Trust in parties is low but stable over time; and trust in 
institutions shows very small changes over time. Even though trust 
in politicians has decreased during the last half decade, from 2015 
a modest shift upwards can be observed. It remains to be seen if 
it continues into this year. We also know that more than half of all 
Swedes trust TV and radio to a high degree. 1 Trust in print media is 
lower, at 29 percent with high trust, but this number has been stable 
for sixteen years. 2
The troublesome development for the media, which runs parallel 
to its financial troubles and possibly to some degree explains the 
rise of the Sweden Democrats, is the strong and significant correla-
tion between party identification and mistrust in the media that is 
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has been steadily rising since 2010. Somewhat simplified, the more 
right-leaning you are the less you trust the media.
Parallel to this development, the extremely high penetration of 
smartphones and high speed mobile access in Sweden has supplied 
the infrastructure for people accessing news online anytime and 
anywhere. In general, Swedes are very interested in American 
politics and follow it more closely than some domestic issues (espe-
cially since last November). The net has also as is the case in most 
countries provided a platform for the anti-Muslim/anti-immigration 
voice, as is the case in most countries. In the Swedish case, it is in 
part directed by and helped by the afore mentioned party.
Price of news
But the crisis of the media cannot be blamed on a political party. 
The core issue is instead the slow adaptation to the demand for 
digital distribution, the lack of demand, and the fact that the price 
of news is steadily above the demand. Most media companies lock 
in quality material — i.e. the material that is expensive to produce — 
behind pay walls. Particularly the print media based in rural areas 
are having problems attracting people to their paid services. Con-
sequently, the news that is free is increasingly what is cheap and 
fast to produce, namely opinion journalism. The number of people 
Consumtion of daily / morning and evening newspapers at least 3 times/week,  
in both print and digital from 1986—2016
Source: Ulrika Andersson. SOM institute rapport no. 70. University of Got henburg, 2017, 283
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who have access to quality investigative journalism will most likely 
decrease in Sweden in the coming years to come.
This trend is aggravated by the kind of storytelling people demand 
and what the net lends itself to the best: The subjective, the personal 
and the controversial. The biggest daily in Sweden (Dagens Nyheter) 
has as many social media interactions as one of the anti-immigration 
“news” sites. A single social media savvy member of the conservative 
party has by himself more interactions than his entire party.
The subjective & the personal
This changing dynamics highlights the dilemma. People seem to 
demand opinions, but why pay for them from to news companies 
when you can get them for free from the plethora of voices online. 
By supplying what is potentially viral material, the news companies 
also seem to in part partially undermine their own business model 
of selling de facto news. As one editor expressed it, “people used to 
think we reported too much that is personal; nowadays, they think 
we withhold.”
These trends, of course, tie into the political realm. There is 
an increasing personification of politics where focus more and 
more shifts more and more from faceless parties to party leaders. 
The subjective and the personal is in demand in this arena also. 
A similar development is a personification of journalists, both as 
print/digital media lends itself more to opinion journalism but 
also as journalists become the faces of the news. Journalists are 
increasingly marketed as the a product rather than the news.
Given the complex (or possibly normal from a continental 
perspective) situation of forming a new government next year given 
and The Sweden Democrats’ swing role, which could complicate 
the formation of a3 liberal-conservative or socialist government, 
the media is increasingly focusing on game theory. One would be 
hard pressed to say it is not news worthy. But it is also a trend with 
economical underpinnings — it is indefinitely easier and faster to 
produce than investigative journalism that delves deep into policy. 
As such it is both a temperature gauge on the health of the news 
media, as it is worrisome. Research shows that populist political 
forces thrive in a media climate that focuses on persons and game 
theory rather than policy issues. 4
Catching the digital cat
All in all, Swedish media has its challenges ahead of itself. But all 
is not dark. The biggest Swedish dailies have managed to shift at 
least somewhat successfully to a digital business model and remain 
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profitable. The Swedish media landscape in general is also signifi-
cantly less cynical and decidedly more objective than for example 
British, Italian and French media.
But the question of profitability remains top of mind, mostly for 
print/digital media in the rural areas of Sweden. The digital cat is 
out of the bag, and it cannot be put back in. The core issue remains: 
print seems to be dying, but too few shift to digital subscriptions.
As of last year, the Department of Culture is has been preparing 
for a new financial support scheme for the media that is meant to 
be neutral to change forms of distribution. 5 It remains to be seen if 
it fixes the financial woes of Swedish print media. The jury is still out, 
but I am hard pressed to see any other stop gap measure.
1 Note that Swedish radio and TV are 
dominated by public service compa-
nies, SVT (TV) and SR (radio). Commer-
cial TV has, with but one exception, 
no news programs at all.
2 SOM institute rapport nr. 70. Uni-
versity of Gothenburg, 2017, 20
3  Strömbäck et. al. Populist political 
communication in Europe. Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2017, chapter 27.
4 Some seventy newspapers in 
Sweden receive a special financial aid 
known as “presstöd” since they are 
deemed vital to democratic society 
and discourse.
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Broken Compass
Same as all around Europe and the world, hate speech and 
xenophobia are on the rise in Slovenia. As a study conducted by 
Peace Institute (Slovenian nongovernmental organisation) shows, 
the number of reports of hate speech was the highest in the years 
of the economic crisis. Many people, especially those with low 
education and low income, lost their jobs. The only question back 
then was who would be blamed for it.
Lost Authorities
The first under attack of criticism was political elite. Citizens were 
sure that all politicians were corrupted by multinational corpora-
tions which bought once prosperous Slovenian companies. That 
caused political turmoil and none of the governments would finish 
their mandate. Dissatisfaction led to the biggest demonstrations 
since Slovenia became independent.
The second target of Slovenes was the Roman Catholic Church. 
It was involved in one of the greatest financial scandals in history 
and many shareholders were deeply affected by it.1
The Church became one of the most hated institutions in Slov-
enia and lost trust even among its strongest believers.
After the nation lost two moral authorities — politicians and 
the Roman Catholic Church — nobody could stop hate speech and 
xenophobia because Slovenes “lost their moral compass” as the 
phrase became known in Slovenia.
And that leads us to the third and most fragile target of the ma-
jority in the economic crisis — minorities. The first minority that had 
to confront hate speech and xenophobia were foreigners, especially 
those from ex-Yugoslavia. Some people came under impression 
they were “stealing our jobs”. A sad excuse — most of workers from 
ex-Yugoslavia were working in construction, cleaning and other low 
income businesses that Slovenians would not accept.
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Also the LGBT community was harmed by xenophobia. In 2009, 
a well known same-sex rights activist was brutally attacked by 
unknown perpetrators in Ljubljana, the Slovenian capital and a city 
considered to be most liberal in the country. Perpetrators were 
screaming insulting words (for example “fagot”). The peak of hatred 
towards gays and lesbians came in December 2015. On December 
22nd, just three days before Christmas, a referendum on same-sex 
marriage took place. After long and many times offensive campaign 
the law was rejected. What is worst is that the voters who were in 
favour of same-sex marriage would not get out to vote.
Slovenian same-sex 
marriage referendum 
results
Source: Wikipedia
Choice Votes  %
No 394,482 63,51
2016 226,651 36,49
Invalid or blank votes 2,356 0,38
Total votes 623,489 100,00
Registered voters and turnout 1,715,518 36,38
Share of “No” votes in Slovenia 
same-sex marriage referendum
Source: Wikipedia
50%—55%
55%—60%
60%—65%
65%—70%
70%—75%
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In the last couple of years, refugees were victims of excessive 
patriotism. Same as in Germany, for example, people were very 
helpful towards refugees coming to Slovenia. But it soon changed, 
after a couple of months. There were demonstrations in front of 
asylum homes, graffiti “Refugees go home” appeared etc. In the 
beginning of 2017, the Foreigners Act was adopted. It decreases pos-
sibilities of refugees to obtain asylum in Slovenia and is considered 
unconstitutional among the majority of Slovenian lawyers. In a cou-
ple of weeks, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia 
will pass a ruling on this subject.
Fast-Track Course of Democracy
Are economic crisis, lack of moral authorities and refugee crisis 
(or better: challenge) the only reasons for the rise of hate speech 
and xenophobia in Slovenia? I do not think so. They are not even 
the main reasons, they are only accelerators.
After almost 50 years of (so-called) socialism, oppression of 
the civil society and the dominance of the Roman Catholic Church 
(especially in ex-Yugoslavia a moral authority and one of the bases 
of the Slovenian nation) Slovenia became independent in 1991. Free 
speech, criticism of the authorities — it all became allowed in a very 
short period of time.
Before Yugoslavia, the Slovenian nation lived in the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia, Kingdom of Slovenians, Croats and Serbs and in the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, and we had no democratic tradition. 
When Slovenia became a democracy we took it by the handful. 
Since gaining independence, Slovenians are sure that human rights, 
including freedom of speech, are absolute. But no right is abso-
lute — it is limited by rights of others and its own nature. With the 
exception of some intellectuals (and younger generations, I hope) 
the true meaning of democracy and limits of human rights are not 
yet implanted in Slovenian minds.
Brighter Future
What is the right step forward towards more open and accepting 
Slovenian society? In my opinion it is education.
In primary schools and secondary schools, Slovenian pupils 
learn a lot about integrals, Newton’s laws and Darwin’s evolutionary 
theory. There is not enough emphasis on social studies, law, and 
citizenship education. It is no surprise that many young people want 
to study those subjects at universities because they did not get any 
knowledge of them in earlier years of their education (me included).
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As said before, Slovenians lost moral authorities in economic 
crisis and now we have to readjust our moral compass. As a ray 
of hope, new generation of politicians is appearing, not troubled 
by corruption scandals and with a vision of Slovenia as one of the 
lighthouses of freedom and human rights in the European Union. 
Now, almost ten years after the beginning of the crisis and most 
importantly, at a time when democratic institutions are much more 
developed, the Slovenian nation trusts more the Government, the 
National Assembly and the judiciary system. But only to some extent.
Where to find true, long-standing moral authorities? In the 
future, when crisis perhaps reappears, who will be the one to tell 
Slovenians that hate speech and xenophobia have no place in 
modern society?
Firstly, it has to be parents raising young children nowadays. 
Nelson Mandela said people learn to hate and if they can learn to 
hate, they can be taught to love. It is parents’ obligation to teach 
their children they should think of others and not only of themselves.
Secondly, teachers are the ones who influence young genera-
tions the most. They should teach pupils to look at the problems 
of modern society from critical distance. I strongly believe that the 
same emphasis should be put on Social Sciences, the Basics of Law, 
the European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights 
that it is on Physics, Mathematics and Biology.
1 Two holdings owned by Maribor 
Archdiocese were involved in a 
financial scandal which resulted in a 
massive loss. A priest who was  also 
head of Archdiocese’s finances was 
accused of business fraud.  
In September 2017, former archbishop 
from Maribor was summoned to court 
as well. Litigation is still pending. More 
on that: http://www.sloveniatimes.
com/top-church-dignitaries-step-
down-in-wake-of-financial-scandal.
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Seeing Minorities as Enemies: 
What Keeps Slovakia Behind
“I wanted to flee from Slovakia. With our Slumdog Theatre, we 
performed in the Brussels and in Bratislava. I know one can live 
differently. When I was 26, I came to the capital city — Bratislava 
for the first time in my life. It was an enormous experience. Only in 
Bratislava I felt as a human. In Moldava, in the settlement that I live, 
I felt as a Gypsy… Now I am scared. Sometime I am so scared that 
I am unable to sleep. The worst are the evenings, when I start to think 
what would happen with my sister and her three sons... Who will help 
them, when I end up in jail?” 1
Truth
In his recently published blog, Milan Igor Hudák wrote about his life 
as a Roma from a poor settlement living in Slovakia. He wrote about 
being scared that he would go to jail for telling the truth. Milan 
was one of the victims beaten by police during the raid into the 
settlement Budulovská in Moldava nad Bodvou. On June 19th, 2013, 
63 heavily guarded police officers driving in 23 cars entered the poor 
Romani settlement — an area where people struggle to get drinking 
water. According to witnesses, during the raid, police commando 
were randomly beating people and entering their homes. No judicial 
warrant allowing such actions was issued. The police claimed that 
it was seeking some “suspects”. The police, however, detained 
15 people because they were not carrying their IDs. None of them 
were under a search warrant. Beaten Roma believed that the raid 
was caused by a very personal reprisal of the local police officers 
against them.  2
Officially, the city of Moldava nad Bodvou justified the raid as 
a response to the recently increased criminality in the local super-
market. The raid caused a significant outrage among local, as well as 
international human rights, community. 3 The Ombudswoman Jana 
Dubovcova found that the raid was illegal and Roma’s basic human 
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rights were violated. 4 By contrast, Prime Minister Robert Fico arrived 
during his (then lost) presidential campaign to the police station in 
Moldava in February 2014 to officially support concerned police offic-
ers. 5 Fico has repeatedly associated this, in his words, unadaptable 
population with increased criminality that threatens the majority that 
needs to be protected. 6 At one occasion, the prime minister even 
said that Roma deserved “extreme” measures in violation of human 
rights standards. 7 A well-known Roma activist and journalist working 
in eastern Slovakia recently noted that police raids are rather a com-
mon strategy for keeping Roma at bay. Roma somehow accepted 
that as a necessary evil, if they are to survive. Roma’s distrust of 
police is enormous. Most of violations are not even reported. 8
Wall
The inspection section of the Ministry of Interior, investigating 
the raid found no violation of rights of the Roma. The inspection 
falls within jurisdiction of the same minister that oversees police 
forces. 9 In summer 2017, Milan with other beaten Roma victims 
A Diaspora of 11 Million
Estimates of Roma populations vary. 
These figures are from the Council  
of Europe, a human rights organization. 
Source: The New York Times
Roma share of population:
1 to 2,9%
3 to 6,0%
more than 7%
Each symbol represents:
50,ooo Roma
20,000—49,999
under 20,000
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became accused of perjury. 10 During the 2017 summer holidays, 
the town of Moldava nad Bodvou also built a wall to even further 
separate two already segregated schools — one attended by non-
Romani and the other by Romani children. Arguably, that was done 
to ensure safety of non-Roma’s. This event caught the head master 
of Romani school by surprise. There were no problems with Romani 
children harming their non-Romani peers. 11
The Moldava’s story captures notable aspects of serious 
democratic and human rights deficiencies in Slovakia. Minorities 
are inherently viewed with suspicions, as potential threats and 
enemies. This is a conscious work of political elites over the 
decades. The securitization of minorities is used to justify measures 
that seriously curtail minorities’ human rights and prevent their full 
integration into the society. Often, securitization of minorities is 
used as a strategy to cover the inability of the country’s leadership 
to tackle widespread corruption, poor quality of educational and 
health care services, unemployment, or poor labor conditions of low 
income workers. Hatred and exclusion of minorities thus prevents 
the entire country to progress towards becoming a prosperous and 
inclusive democracy.
Myth
The securitization strategy, employed by almost entire political 
spectrum, tends to target different minorities depending on 
a broader political context. In the 1990’s it was especially aimed 
at the Hungarian minority. Predecessors of the Hungarians living 
in Slovakia have been collectively annexed to the former Czecho-
slovakia after WWI. The portrayal of them being a threat has been 
centred around the myth of their inherent desire to seek unity with 
the neighbouring Hungarians. 12 As far as I am aware, none of the 
Hungarian elites in power ever made such claims, nor, for that mat-
ter, even dared to talk about territorial autonomy. Yet we have seen 
redrawing of administrative borders in 1990 causing Hungarians 
to weaken politically at regional level. In 2007 restrictive language 
followed, and later citizenship laws significantly curtailed the ability 
of the Hungarian minority to culturally reproduce themselves. 13
Recently, politicians have been most intensely targeting the 
Roma who were, in their view, endangering Slovaks with their 
‘criminality’ as well as ‘freeriding’ lifestyle and laziness. Aside from 
arguably regular police raids targeting settlements, Slovakia has 
also adopted a rather restrictive workfare policy ensuring that their 
“threatening lifestyle” is at bay.  14
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The refugee crisis in 2015, that peaked shortly before parliamen-
tary elections, offered a fertile ground for securitization of a few 
Muslim migrants living in Slovakia. 15 The parliament consequently, 
rather smoothlyin a smooth manner, amended the law on churches, 
making conditions for the recognition of Islam or any other minority 
religion impossible to achieve. 16 In fact, the same strategy of secu-
ritization , exploited was exploiting Christian and nationalist parties 
and the movement that constructed LGBTI minority as to pose them 
as threatening to the so- called ‘traditional family’. Even though 
their Referendum on Family in 2015 was eventually unsuccessful, 
the movement thanks tois to be thanked for the securitization of 
gays and lesbians; nevertheless it has achieved the constitutional 
amendment preventing recognition of the same sex marriages. 17
The securitization keeps minorities at societal margins. This is 
especially visible when it comes to Roma who have been facing 
exclusion, degrading treatment, genocide or aggressive assimilation 
for centuries. Overcoming stereotypes and even anti-gypsyism, as 
illustrated by convincement of non-Romani parents not to take 
their children to schools attended by Romani children, for example, 
is extremely challenging when elites consistently confirm worries 
of parents that Romani children can threaten their children. Thus, 
the schools, like one in Moldava, build walls, create segregated 
classrooms, playgrounds, or toilets to keep the non-Romani children 
from their Romani peers. 18 Statistically, 62 percent of Romani chil-
dren study mostly with almost or mostly Romani peers. 19 Moreover, 
the quality of segregated schools such lowis at such low level that 
children are unlikely to make to it to the final grade.
The segregated world, that which became a common and 
unquestioned practice, teaches children from early age that some 
mean more than others only because of their skin color. 20 The every-
day experience of injustice is not only reserved to Roma, but to other 
minorities as well. The feelings are everyday reality for LGBTI whose 
same sex relationships are misrecognized. Gay and lesbian couples 
living in Slovakia, for instance, cannot even request medical informa-
tion while their partner’s life is at peril. The same goes for Muslims, 
who are confronted with suspicions, profiling, and hatred daily. Like 
Igor, they can rightly doubt whether the state institutions that should 
ensure that they can lead a dignified life are there for them.
Some observers argued thatargued that the securitization of mi-
norities (and the inability to integrate them) has been also one of the 
factors that paved the way to the political success of the fascist’s 
party Ľudová strana — Naše Slovensko lead by Marián Kotleba. 
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There was simplySimply, there was someone else who offered more 
likable and radical solutions.  21 Kotleba, a former school teacher, 
is seen by many, perhaps frustrated, Slovaks as a hero who has the 
courage to march into settlements, buy land underneath illegally 
built Romani shanty houses, or put patrols to guard trains. 22
Trap
The trap has closed. The fascists are nowNow, the fascists are 
not only heading the regional unit that lead the Slovak national 
uprising in 1944 against the fascism, but they are also comfortably 
seated in the parliament with a steady political support of the 
electorate. 23 TheWhen the attorney general motioned to dissolute 
the party for threatening democracy. 24 Kotleba in turn registered 
another party where he can harbour himself and the party’s 
leadership. 25 And Last but not least, the prime minister continues 
to blaming blame the Roma; most recently even with the help of 
earlier statements of Kotleba. 26
Yet there is only one way out of the trap if Slovakia wants to 
remain a prosperous democracy. It requires the political courage 
to convince people that treatment of minorities shall be based 
on justice and human dignity principles rather than security and 
hatred. Such political courage entails the commitment to recognize 
minorities as equals, to respect their human and minority rights, 
and ensuring that they can fully trust the state and its institutions; 
also, sharing with them opportunities that the society offers to lead 
a good life. Sadly, the treatment of Igor and of the entire issue does 
not give much hope for such a change in near future.
 
1  Milan (Igor) Hudák, “V Bratislave 
sa cítim ako človek, doma som len 
Cigán” (blog) Denník N, 5.9.2017, 
online at https://dennikn.sk/859077/v-
bratislave-sa-citim-ako-clovek-doma-
som-len-cigan/ 
2 Úrad verejného ochrancu práv, Mi-
moriadna správa verejného ochrancu 
práv o skutočnostiach nasvedčujúcich 
závažnému porušeniu základných práv 
a slobôd konaním niektorých orgánov 
(Bratislava, august 2013), online http://
www.vop.gov.sk/files/Mimoriadna%20
sprava%20VOP.pdf p. 13—15. 
3 See numerous statements of NGO‘s 
or IGO‘s active in human rights issues 
of the event; in particular, European 
Roma Rights Centre has been active — 
see e.g. their statement ERRC, “Slovak 
authorities Must Investigate the Police 
Action in Romani Settlement Moldava 
nad Bodvou”, 24 June 2013, online at 
http://www.errc.org/article/slovak-au-
thorities-must-investigate-the-police-
action-in-romani-settlement-moldava-
nad-bodvou/4156 
4 Please see the report referenced in 
supra note 2. 
5 „Fico: Do Moldavy nad Bodvou som 
prišiel povzbudiť policajtov”, TASR, 
1 February 2014, online at https://
spravy.pravda.sk/svet/clanok/307151-
fico-do-moldavy-nad-bodvou-som-
prisiel-povzbudit-policajtov/  
6 See e.g. in ibid. or more recently 
in, “Fico pobúril Rómov. Na svojich 
postojoch však nič meniť nebude”, 
TASR, 16 December 2016, online http://
hnonline.sk/slovensko/877880-fico-
poburil-romov-na-svojich-postojoch-
vsak-nic-menit-nebude
Jarmila Lajčáková Seeing Minorities as Enemies: What Keeps Slovakia Behind
7 See e.g. in “Situácia s Rómami 
si podľa Fica vyžaduje extrémne 
riešenia”, TASR, 19 February 2013, on-
line https://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/
clanok/259532-fico-romsku-otazku-
treba-zacat-riesit-od-deti/ 
8 Jarmila Vaňová in her personal 
recollection on September 3, 2017.
9 „Zásah polície v rómskej osade 
v Moldave bol v poriadku, rozhodla 
inšpekcia”,aktuality.sk, 13 March 
2016, online https://www.aktuality.sk/
clanok/326011/zasah-policie-v-rom-
skej-osade-v-moldave-bol-v-poriadku-
rozhodla-inspekcia/
10 Veronika Prušová, “Z obetí robia 
páchateľov, svedkov policajnej razie 
v Moldave obvinili z krivej výpovede”, 
Denník N, 6 September 2017, online 
https://dennikn.sk/872764/z-obeti-
robia-pachatelov-svedkov-policajnej-
razie-v-moldave-obvinili-z-krivej-
vypovede/
11 Veronika Prušová, “Riaditeľka róm-
skej školy, ktorú oddelili plotom: Tu v 
Moldave si anšu prácu s deťmi väčšina 
neváži”, Denník N, 3 september 2017, 
online https://dennikn.sk/869344/
riaditelka-romskej-skoly-ktoru-oddeli-
li-plotom-tu-v-moldave-si-nasu-pracu-
s-detmi-vacsina-nevazi/
12 See in more detail e.g. in Jarmila 
Lajčáková ed., Menšinová politika 
na Slovensku v roku 2011 (CVEK, 
Bratislava: 2012) and especially ap-
pendix Menšinová politika v politickom 
diskurze at 119, online at http://cvek.
sk/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/
Mensinova-politika-na-Slovensku-v-
roku-2011.pdf
13 Ibid. See aAlso see more detail e.g. 
in Jarmila Lajčáková ed., Menšinová 
politika na Slovensku v roku 2012 
(CVEK, Bratislava: 2013) http://cvek.sk/
wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Mensino-
va-politika-2012.pdf
14 See in more detail Jarmila 
Lajčáková et. al, Nezamestnanosť 
Rómov: od mýtusu k politikám a späť 
(CVEK:Bratislava, 2017) online http://
cvek.sk/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/
Nezamestnanost-Romov_studia.pdf
15 One of the most notable state-
ments of the prime minister Fico 
suggested that the entire Muslim 
community in Slovakia is monitored. 
“Fico pobúril výrokom o monitorovaní 
moslimov ich komunitu”, noviny. Sk, 
16 Nnovember 2015, online at https://
www.noviny.sk/slovensko/154627-
fico-poburil-vyrokom-o-monitorovani-
moslimov-ich-komunitu
16 „Poslanci prelomili veto preziden-
ta, sprísnia sa podmienky registrácie 
cirkví”, SITA, 31 January 2017, online 
https://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/
clanok/418488-poslanci-prelomili-
veto-prezidenta-schvalili-zakon-o-
cirkvach/
17 „Novela ústavy je podľa LGBTI 
odporný kšeft, biskupi ďakujú”, SITA, 
4 June 2014, online https://www.
webnoviny.sk/novela-ustavy-je-podla-
lgbti-odporny-kseft-biskupi-dakuju/
18 See e.g. Civil Society Monitoring 
Report on the Implementation of the 
National Roma Integration Strategy 
and Decade Action Plan in 2012 in 
Slovakia (Budapest: Secretariat of 
Decade of Roma Inclusion Founda-
tion, 2013), available at http://www.
romadecade.org/cms/upload/
file/9270_file14_sk_civil-society-
monitoring-report_en.pdf, or more 
recent Amnesty International and 
European Roma Rights Centre, A Les-
son in Discrimination:Segregation of 
Romani Children in Primary Education 
in Slovakia, (AI, ERRC: Budapest, 2017) 
available at http://www.errc.org/cms/
upload/file/report-lesson-in-discrimi-
nation-english.pdf
19 EU-MIDIS 2 data with selected 
findings on Roma integration are 
available at http://fra.europa.eu/en/
publication/2016/eumidis-ii-roma-
selected-findings.
20 See especially in the AI and ERRC 
report cited in supra note 18.
21 Grigorij Mesežnikov a Oľga 
Gyarfášová, Súčasný pravicový 
extrémizmus a ultranacionalizmus 
na Slovensku: stav, trendy, podpora 
(Bratislava: Inštitút pre verejné otázky, 
2016) at 22 and ff and 39 and ff.
22 See some of activities of ĽSNS 
e.g. in ibid. at 28.
23 For a reliable source on political 
preferences of parties, please see the 
FOCUS agency at http://www.focus-
research.sk/?section=show&id=10
24 Peter Kováč “Generálny prokurá-
tor navrhol zrušiť Kotlebovu stranu”, 
SME, 25 Máj 2017, online https://domov.
sme.sk/c/20541913/ciznar-dal-podal-
podnet-na-rozpustenie-kotlebovej-
strany.html?ref=tab
25 „Kotlebova záložná strana má 
nové meno”, akutality. Sk, 12 Jjune 
2017, online https://www.aktuality.sk/
clanok/496399/kotlebova-zalozna-
strana-ma-nove-meno/
26 Dušan Mikušovič, “Fico použil v 
televízií slovo “Cigán” Kiska varoval 
pred šírením nenávisti, Denník N, 
29 Január 2017, online https://dennikn.
sk/669793/fico-pouzil-v-slovo-cigan-
kiska-varoval-pred-sirenim-nenavisti/
44 — 45
Romania #checksandbalances #legitimacy
 The Jigsaw
The governing coalition of PSD 1 and ALDE, elected in December 2016 
and holding ~54% of parliamentary seats, seems indecisive in exercis-
ing executive power. The declining voter turnout, the street protests 
of February, and the curious change of prime-minister in June raise 
legitimate questions about Romania’s flawed democracy (a governing 
coalition lasts, on average, under 15 months). Observers blame PSD 
and ALDE’s poor communication skills, but the coalition rather lacks 
clarity of purpose, as well as competency. Many political leaders, 
of the coalition and opposition alike, are investigated, indicted, or 
already sentenced for various crimes of corruption and/or abuse of 
power. The public is particularly suspicious of reforms in the justice 
system, as politicians may attempt to clear their criminal records.
The situation is further complicated by the president elected 
from the opposing political camp (November 2014, initially affiliated 
with PNL). Political parties undergo a third consecutive year of 
internal adjustments and reforms, mergers and splits, as well as 
re-affiliations to European political families. The electoral reforms 
of 2015 allowed the maverick USR to get into the Parliament (loose 
connections with technocrat ministers from 2016), but their political 
naïveté reinforces PNL’s collusion with PSD. PMP has astrong 
anti-PSD rhetoric, but often supports (discretely) PSD and ALDE’s 
judicial “reforms,” alongside UDMR. The opposition appears weak 
and confused, further alienating voters and possibly resulting in 
even lower turnout at the next elections.
Waiting for mega-elections
Yet, Romania fulfills its obligations with NATO and has a decent pres-
ence in international affairs, owing to the President’s constitutional 
role in foreign affairs. Dangers connected with terrorism, refugees, 
or Russian propaganda are rather low priorities on the public and 
political agendas. During the first half of 2019, Romania will hold the 
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rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. Elections 
are expected again in June 2019 (EU Parliament), November 2019 
(President), June 2020 (local authorities), December 2020 (national 
Parliament). Then, all rounds of elections will realign throughout 
2024, raising concerns with both: the mega-elections of that year 
and the potential consolidation of power during 2020—28.
In spite of economic growth currently reported at 5%, the state 
budget suffers from structural deficiencies. Lack of infrastructure 
and public investments couple with ~40% of the population living 
below poverty level. Salaries increase artificially in the public 
sector (notably in health care and education), but fail to boost the 
pension and social assistance systems making it unsustainable 
for the coming decade. The economy is not competitive enough 
for the EU market, while absorption of EU funds is stalled for a third 
consecutive year, and accession to Schengen and Eurozone is 
constantly postponed. The resurgence of “traditions” pushes for 
a constitutional referendum against gay marriage, while nationalist 
movements may grow in the wake of the 100-year celebration 
of “Great Romania” (1 December 1918).
The governing coalition’s concern with budget revenues, 
including the pension system, reflects in the volume of legislative 
proposals during the first session of Parliament: more than 1⁄3 relate 
to fiscal and labor matters. The Cabinet fails to improve collection 
of indirect contributions, and hence attempts to close the gap of 
budget revenues while rolling out the structural deficiencies beyond 
2020. While the economy tends towards individual entrepreneur-
ship (no direct budget contributions aside from VAT), the coalition 
Note: Blank years in this 
graph refer to other types 
of elections: for President 
(2009, 2014), for EU Parlia-
ment (2007, 2009, 2014) or 
for referendums (2003, 
2007, 2009, 2012).
Voter turnout in Romanian elections
Source: Factual, 2016
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presses for labor contracts (with direct collection of income tax 
and social assistance contributions). An increasing number of labor 
contracts may yield additional votes in the next elections, but this 
strategy fails to prevent a severe financial crisis that may result 
from contradictions in employment.
Representation
Aside from severe democratic deficiencies in good governance, 
Romania also has problems with political representation. Most 
political parties seem to be tempted with the illiberal tendencies 
from Hungary and Poland, while none of them has an outspoken 
agenda on fundamental rights and freedoms. Most decision-makers 
have a poor (or willingly distorted) understanding of the interplay 
among human rights, rule of law, and separation of powers. The 
Constitutional Court and Ombudsman too often side with politicians, 
away from citizens. Politicians (in power or in opposition, at all 
levels of government) display a worrisome inability of opening to 
the public, of communicating their vision in plain language- most 
probably lacking a clear vision. As a result, public institutions tend 
to close their doors to public consultations and/or participation 
in decision-making, in spite of Romania faring quite well in the Open  
Government Partnership.
Alienated, the public turns back from democratic participation, 
either taking institutions to the courts (very rare), or resorting to 
anti-system rhetoric (still not too extremist), or simply bailing out 
in disgust (vast majority of non-voters). As long as an even newer 
political party fails to appear, the existing vote-seeking politicians 
manipulate the electoral laws in a way that ensures the appearance 
of democratic legitimacy, they play on fears during electoral cam-
paigns, and collude with electoral competitors in order to preserve 
the benefits of their political clients. To wit, Romania’s local govern-
ment is atomized in ~3,200 municipalities, owing to the mayors’ 
legal prerogative to organize the (logistics for) elections; bound by 
financial dependency to the central government, mayors are key to 
winning any electoral confrontation.
The organizational culture and promotion mechanisms within 
political parties rely on the ability to win elections (USR may be the 
exception). Campaign managers or top candidates focus on two 
strategies in elections: alienating the opponent’s voters and consoli-
dating their own core of unconditional supporters. Thus, academics 
or experts in public management get marginalized from party ranks, 
and the parties no longer have the expertise or competency to 
Codru Vrabie The Jigsaw
manage either institutions or crisis. Consequently, parties cannot 
formulate a vision, offer purpose, nor propose meaningful reforms. 
Winning an election thus exposes political leaders to criticism from 
civil society; in turn, elected officials resort to opacity in decision-
making, false accusations against NGOs, and populism in relation 
to voters, closing the vicious circle of political alienation.
The judiciary is under constant pressure from politicians, pre-
cisely due to electoral reasons (yet, magistrates also fail to address 
the public at large). In order to preserve the mayors’ dependency on 
the central government, several schemes for discretionary funding 
are created. Approval of such disbursements may result in crimes 
Romania’s ranking in The Economist’s Democracy Index
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017
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of abuse or even corruption. Politicians would therefore prefer a le-
gal system that disregards accountability or dilutes the definitions 
of certain crimes, one that curbs the enthusiasm of anticorruption 
prosecutors, and/or at least one that subordinates magistrates to 
political will. In this respect, collusion among the Executive, the par-
liamentary, and Constitutional Court majorities faces a very fragile, 
conjectural alliance among the civil society at large, President, and 
European Commission (via CVM).
In spite of optimistic views regarding Romania’s reaching a tip-
ping point in 2014/2015, the country remains a flawed democracy, 
marred with ineffective and opaque governance. The electoral 
competition, in and of itself, cannot fix the structural problems 
created by incompetent decision-makers. Genuine social assistance 
or antidiscrimination cannot succeed, just as Europeanization and 
anticorruption seem stalled for now. The alternative, autarchic 
solution, is highly improbable to succeed, albeit embraced in the 
rhetoric of the governing coalition (PSD and ALDE) and some mem-
bers of the opposition (PNL and PMP, most notably). The 100-year 
celebration of 2018 may set Romania’s democratic vs. illiberal 
course at least until the mega-electoral year of 2024.
1 Political parties represented in Parliament (percentage of MPs in both 
 Chambers, rounded):
PSD, 48% — Social Democratic Party, affiliated with PES;
ALDE, 6% — Alliance of Liberals and Democrats, a group split from PNL, 
 affiliated with ALDE;
PNL, 21% — National Liberal Party, affiliated with EPP since they left ALDE  
in 2014;
USR, 9% — Save Romania Union, not yet affiliated to a European political  
family;
UDMR,* 6% — Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, affiliated with EPP;
PMP, 6% — Popular Movement Party (loyalists to former President Băsescu), 
affiliated with EPP;
MIN,* 4% — individual deputies from national minorities, elected on separate, 
reserved seats;
Romania has 21 more political parties with elected representatives in local 
 government, and other 40+ that did not earn enough votes or simply did not yet 
run in elections.
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Alienated, the public turns back 
from democratic participation, 
either taking institutions to the 
courts (very rare), or resorting 
to anti-system rhetoric (still not 
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out in disgust (vast majority 
of non-voters).
Codru Vrabie
Portugal #stability
 For bigger stability
The consolidation of the democratic process in Portugal represents 
one of the central axes of the political and electoral system analysis. 
43 years after the Carnation Revolution, there is a need to reflect 
and analyze the challenges of the current democracy in a context 
where a populist, nationalist and eurosceptic feeling grows in 
several European countries.
With Portugal free from the pressure of such movements, it is 
important to look deep at two of the main challenges of the demo-
cratic consolidation, namely: government stability, measured by the 
length of term of each executive government and the exponential 
growth of the electoral abstention rate in legislative elections since 
the first democratic election held in 1975.
The consolidation of the Portuguese democracy occurs 
simultaneously with the process of accession to the European 
Union, making Portugal one of the paradigmatic examples of the 
third phase of democratization in the 20th century. This fact, along 
with the strong connection of the national political parties and their 
European counterparts, allowed a full integration in the western 
democratic values.
However, the political systems and regimes are not immune to 
the consequences of its own functioning (system mutability), nor to 
the structural changes that occur in society, namely the multiplica-
tion of alternative forms of political participation and the diversifica-
tion of the ways to communicate resulting from the increase of new 
technologies.
The choice of these two indicators (governance stability and the 
electoral turnout) is essential when measuring the quality of democ-
racy and is directly connected with two other fundamental points: 
the political conditions for the implementation of a government pro-
gram and the effective participation of citizens in the choice of their 
representatives. These pillars are fundamental to the functioning of 
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democracy, in a context where the continuous alienation of citizens 
in the electoral processes constitutes an opportunity for extremist 
parties and economic groups to capture democracy.
21 Governments in 39 Years
During the democratic regime, Portugal counts 21 constitutional 
governments (between 1976 and 2015), which means an average 
of a government each two years, precisely half the time expected 
for each legislature. In fact, only 5 governments fulfilled their 
mandates until the end, namely the governments led by Cavaco 
Silva in 1987 and 1991, the first government led by António Guterres 
in 1995, the first government led by José Sócrates in 2005 and the 
executive led by Passos Coelho in 2011.
Based on this analysis, it is possible to identify a pattern regard-
ing the electoral results. In fact, the government led by António 
Guterres was the only one which did not have a majority in the 
national parliament, and was the only minority government to last 
the predicted time frame of the legislature.
Consequently, the difficulties with the parliamentary debate 
and the creation of post electoral coalitions made it harder to 
build the conditions to guarantee the stability of each govern-
ment. The remaining governments were the outcome of absolute 
majorities (1987, 1991 and 2005) and one agreement between the 
right-wing parties (Social Democratic Party and the Popular Party 
in 2011), the latter being the only coalition government to fulfill the 
entirety of its mandate.
The existence of a hybrid political system, characterized by the 
shared powers between the government, the parliament and the 
President of the Republic (a semi-presidential system) has contrib-
uted to the system’s instability.
Unlike the European political tradition of forming coalition 
governments, the Portuguese case shows significant reluctance on 
the part of political parties to embark on multi-party government 
solutions. On the other hand, this centrality of the system around 
the two main parties (Socialist Party and Social Democratic Party) 
is related to the lack of representativeness of smaller parties and 
an increasing number of voters who abstain or who choose to vote 
blank/null.
Only Half Shows Up
Analyzing the electoral participation in the parliamentary elections, 
a significant growth of the abstention is visible; moreover, that 
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growth is continuous, with only two exceptions: the 1980 and 2002 
elections (both elections were anticipated due to the disruption 
of the executive). This significant decrease in voter participation 
calls into question a basic principle of democracy, the effective 
relationship between voters and their representatives, as well 
the involvement of citizens in political life.
The implementation and achievement of democracy demands 
the participation of its citizens, and these numbers in the most 
important elections reflect alienation of almost half the electorate 
of the choice of their representatives in the last legislative elec-
tions. In a brief perspective, the path to guarantee greater stability 
of the national governments and high levels of turnout imposes 
a debate around the electoral and political systems reform, namely 
the electoral formula adopted (the Hondt method) and the obliga-
tion of the electorate to choose their representatives in unique and 
closed lists, preventing a bigger personalization of politics.
Therefore, it is important to analyze the possibility of adopting 
uninominal circles, strengthening the link between the voters and 
their representatives, without neglecting the implementation of 
a national compensation circle to assure the representativeness 
of the various political forces in the national parliament.
The path to democratic sustainability requires a great commit-
ment among all political actors (voters included), as well as bigger 
stability considering the length of term of national governments, 
making it possible to put the country’s interest above partisan 
interests.
Source: National Election 
Commission (www.cne.pt)
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for each legislature.
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Poland #judiciarysystem
 A Myth about Final Victory 
of Democracy
Francis Fukuyama wrote about the end of history and the final 
victory of democracy in 1989. Back then, Poland just started laying 
foundations for the rule of law and a real separation of powers. But 
in 2004, many Poles, including myself, truly believed indeed that it 
was impossible to get lost on the route to democratic development 
we took; that the accession to the European Union finally sealed 
that promise despite the fact that numerous functions of the state 
needed improvements. Subsequent decades revised Fukuyama’s 
thesis on the global level, and similarly, Polish democracy also faced 
an acute crisis in 2015. From the moment the party Law and Justice 
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) took over in Poland, breaking democratic 
standards has become a standard, and a sad reality.
Regress has been observed in an abundance of areas: from 
the limitation of freedom of assembly to increased possibilities 
of citizen surveillance by law enforcement authorities, to a staff 
carousel in the public media full of shameless propaganda. That all 
is not a unique tendency, limited to Poland exclusively. To different 
extent, it is observed in a large part of the EU and other countries, 
using the threat of terrorism as an excuse. What makes the Polish 
case of democracy crisis extraordinary is: in the horizontal perspec-
tive — the method of anti-democratic action and an unprecedented 
attack on the judiciary.
No consultations
During the past two years, the standards of the rule of law and 
democratic debate have been breached in the Polish legislative 
process with respect to virtually all areas of public life. It has 
become a rule to use the so-called “MP-mode” for key systemic 
bills, which obviously have been drawn up by the ministerial clerks. 
However, the bills have not been proposed for the parliamentary de-
bate by the government but groups of MPs who have often known 
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little about the subject matter. Such a mechanism has allowed the 
avoidance of the time consuming procedures of social consultations 
and in-depth analyses of economic and social effects. The manner 
the parliamentary debate has been held is also in breach of the 
fundamental standards of democracy: the opposition MPs’ right 
to speak has been repeatedly limited, bills have been processed 
during night sessions and included into the agenda last minute. 
As a consequence, bills key to Poland’s regime have been voted 
on by the MPs who had had no chance to read the related analyses 
or request expert opinions.
As regards the scope of changes, the attack on the judiciary 
is exceptionally important, as impartial and unbiased courts 
guarantee individual freedoms and, in a broader sense, continuity 
of democratic system. Will a court that is subordinated to the 
political authorities impartially resolve a dispute between a citizen 
and the police who have abused their power against such an 
individual? Will a prosecutor who has a political superior carefully 
"3 x veto!" Image  
from a protest against  
the justice reform 
Source: nowoczesna.org
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examine a case of domestic violence if it concerns a person related 
to the government? Discrediting the impartiality of the judiciary 
undermines the democratic foundations in every aspect.
Unprecedented
The Constitutional Tribunal, which is responsible for monitoring 
the compliance of the Polish legal regulations with the Constitution, 
has become the first victim of the judiciary politicization. Law and 
Justice attacked the institution’s staff already in the first weeks 
after taking over the power in Poland. The President of the Republic 
of Poland refused to administer oaths of three judges lawfully 
appointed by the Sejm (the Parliament) in the previous term. By the 
majority of the ruling party and accompanied by intensive objection 
of the Polish people, the newly elected Sejm appointed its own 
candidates, who then took oaths as “doublers” before the President. 
In an equally unlawful and unprecedented manner, the government 
of the Republic of Poland refused to publish the rulings of the Tri-
bunal which unequivocally indicated that the appointment process 
for judges was in breach of the Constitution.
The attack on the Constitutional Tribunal has not been limited 
to the illegal substitution of the three judges. By virtue of one of 
six acts on the Tribunal from 2015 and 2016, the Sejm (the Polish 
lower chamber) adopted a grievously unconstitutional appointment 
procedure for the President of the Tribunal, which assures that the 
position will be held by a person favouring the ruling party.
The storm on the judiciary staff has not stopped at the Consti-
tutional Tribunal: Law and Justice MPs suggested similar changes 
with regard to common courts, the Supreme Court and the National 
Council of the Judiciary of Poland (KRS), giving the ruling camp 
the possibility of direct impact on the staff. The most intensive 
nationwide demonstrations in the Polish history gave the impetus 
to President’s vetoing the bills regarding the two latter institutions. 
Still, the door to staff purges and politicization of the careers have 
been left open in common courts. The new bill vests the Minister 
for Justice with an unlimited right to replace presidents and vice 
presidents of courts without the opinion of the General Assembly 
of Judges of a given court, which was obligatory before.
The vetoed bills regarding KRS and the Supreme Court ruth-
lessly guaranteed direct influence on the composition of such 
bodies to politicians, too, and in particular to the Minister for Justice. 
In order to accelerate the process of the staff replacement, the bills 
assumed, in breach of the Constitution, shortening the term of office 
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of the present members of such bodies, and introducing the retire-
ment age at 60 for women and 65 for men in the Supreme Court. 
Now, the President has presented new bills on the Supreme Court 
and KRS, which have been again drawn up behind the closed doors 
of the Presidential Palace and without open dialogue with the 
academic and law experts. The President’s proposals indicate that 
the ruling camp will not at the slightest decrease the scope of the 
judiciary politicization. The only thing that would possibly change 
is the supervisor — from the Minister for Justice to the President. 
A large number of the bills’ provisions violate the Polish Constitution: 
the constitutional term of the First President of the Supreme Court 
and the Members of the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland 
as well as the constitutional rule that the judges-members of KRS 
are appointed by judges and not politicians are not respected. 
Chances that during the present term of the Sejm, the standards 
of a democratic state, the rule of law and separation of powers will 
be restored are low. This damage will need making up for over years 
after Law and Justice loses its power in Poland. The confidence 
in public institutions is easily lost but hard to restore.
Nowoczesna (Polish liberal 
 party) fought for independ-
ent courts in the Sejm 
and on the streets 
Source: nowoczesna.org
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 Fighting hate speech 
in Germany: a legal way out?
At the height of the so-called migration crisis in the fall of 2015, 
German TV journalist Anja Reschke could not take it any longer. 
In a widely shared and later award-winning comment, she described 
the sheer scale and graveness of hate she has encountered online 
whenever the discussion turned to refugees or migration. It was 
the beginning of an ongoing, heated, public debate on hate speech 
online and the role of social media platforms in German society.
As a political reaction, in the summer of 2017, the governing 
grand coalition of Conservatives and Social Democrats tightened 
and substantiated the laws governing take-down procedures for 
social media platforms.
The new law, the so called NetzDG, was met with fierce critique 
by free speech organizations and Liberals. The law obliges large 
social media platforms 1 operating in Germany to put into place 
a system in which “obviously illegal” content is to be deleted or 
made inaccessible within 24 hours after its existence has been 
flagged in the platform. Fines of up to 5 million Euros are foreseen 
for non-compliance.
Over-blocking and outsourcing the interpretation of law
Free speech advocates fear that companies might start over-block-
ing content to circumvent these high fines. One of their nightmares 
is: Facebook and Co. will start taking down too much content to be 
on the safe side.
Just to be clear: social media platforms in Germany are already 
obliged to delete illegal content as stated in the German law on 
television and media. Provisions on hate speech are also part of the 
community standards that inform the take-down decisions in social 
media companies. In addition, a voluntary commitment of social 
media platforms to react within 24 hours of being notified has led 
the take-down process too far. The NetzDG changes the voluntary 
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commitment into a legal obligation and substantiates which of-
fenses fall under the umbrella of “hate speech”. Now, platforms like 
Facebook and Twitter have 24 hours to take down “obviously illegal” 
content and seven days in a case of “not obviously illegal” posts.
The risk of over-blocking could especially target content in 
a legal grey zone and extend to satire and culturally sensitive cases. 
This kind of content can be hurtful to some, but not illegal; it might 
also be harmless, yet wrongly interpreted.
In reality, these interpretations will be taken by people employed 
by Facebook’s “care centers”. Although these employees undergo 
trainings, they do not necessarily come with a legal background. Yet, 
they will take a number of quick decisions on sensitive legal ques-
tions touching on the constitutional right of free speech.
Strengthening filter bubbles and polarization
And what happens after a post has been taken down? It’s naïve to 
think that once a post is deleted on a big network like Facebook or 
Twitter its content is gone once and forever. Instead, the same post 
with the same possibly dangerous message will surface somewhere 
else on the web. And this “somewhere” will often be a digital space 
that is more remote from the mainstream discussion and the 
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watchful eyes of thousands of internet users. Smaller platforms, 
which are not targeted by the law, may provide an extremist uni-
verse of its own, luring people into a world of steady reinforcement 
of their beliefs.
Filter bubbles, in which people are no longer exposed to counter 
views, pose a big danger to the democratic debate. Certainly, Face-
book’s algorithms produce one-sided news feeds and discussions 
too. Yet many of the debates are publicly accessible and interaction 
and exchange with the other side is still possible. Counter informa-
tion is just one post or one comment away. Once users are lost to 
shady forums, getting them “back” and engaging in an open debate 
will be more difficult.
For sure, hate speech in its numerous legal manifestations 
cannot enjoy impunity on social media. There should be no place 
for incitement of hate and violence in any digital or physical space. 
Nevertheless it is worth mentioning again that the danger lies in 
restricting free speech in the grey zone.
Studies show that an extensive deletion of a content, especially 
of fake news, which can fall within the scope of the new law, 
Internet users in Germany who agree with social media 
fake news & hate comments law, April 2017
Source: YouGov, April 15, 2017
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reinforces people’s conspiracy theories about society and so-called 
“elites”. Critics fear stronger polarization in society as a consequence 
of the new law and as a result easy exploitation by extremist and 
populist groups.
And the state?
So, if extensive content deletions indeed might prove counter 
 effective and even reinforce extremist worldviews, how can the 
scale of hate on social media platforms be decreased?
Root causes of hate speech such as xenophobia, misogyny, 
homophobia, etc. cannot be mended with the help of legal para-
graphs. What can be done with the help of the law, however, is to 
deter people from engaging in hate speech again, and again, and 
again. Rather than simply deleting an incitement to hatred and 
violence, users should be prosecuted for this kind of severe speech.
While the NetzDG foresees the appointment of a liaison person 
to facilitate communications between the authorities and the 
social media platforms, this seems like nothing more than a good 
intention when Germany is still lagging behind in building a robust 
and efficient system of law enforcement to prosecute criminal 
activities online.
Shared responsibility
As such, the biggest failure of Germany’s recent debate on hate 
speech might be the misconception that responsibility lies solely 
with the big social media companies. The NetzDG tightens and 
substantiates the laws governing take-down procedures on 
social media platforms, while critics fear unwanted over-blocking. 
The process surrounding the hasty adoption of the law failed to 
make sure that law enforcement and criminal prosecution are put 
up to the challenges of the digital age.
Lastly, responsibility is not only shared by platforms and state, 
but most importantly with the citizens themselves. Only an informed 
open debate on such hot topics as, for example, diversity, religion, 
migration, gender, as well as counter speech on hateful content, can 
foster the long term change needed to fight the root causes of hate 
speech. Anja Reske, the German TV journalist, couldn’t have made it 
clearer in her comment: “Open your mouth, take a stand.”
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 Panama Papers and Malta
On 4th of June 2017 the Labour Party won the Maltese general elec-
tion for the second consecutive time. As it was in 2013, its victory 
was tremendous: 54,83% were against the Forza Nazzjonali 1 made 
up of the main opposition party, the Nationalist Party, and the newly 
formed small Democratic Party.
The victory of the Labour was not a surprise. Indeed, this 
victory was one of eight consecutive, local, European and national 
victories between 2009 and 2017. Its results were varying between 
53,4 and 56,6 per cent. Scientific polls were also pointing towards 
a Labour victory.
What was surprising was how Labour achieved such a massive 
victory in the midst of the crisis in governance characterized by 
consistent allegations of corruption. Indeed, the election took place 
a year earlier than predicted, when Prime Minister Joseph Muscat 
found himself embroiled in the mother of all political scandals in 
Maltese politics.
But let’s go back four years. Before the previous 2013 general 
election, then leader of the opposition, Muscat promised a new way 
of governance, characterized by meritocracy and transparency. He 
promised that Malta would belong to all.
Immediately after Labour’s massive victory in 2013, it faced 
criticism on various fronts of its style of governance. Whether this 
had to do with key posts in the public service, development of land, 
public contracts, or selling of passports, Muscat’s government was 
clearly not following its promised script. On the other hand, however, 
the Labour government was delivering in areas such as economic 
growth, employment, and civil liberties.
Panama hits Malta
But then Labour faced a massive scandal with global ramifications: 
Panama Papers.
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Anti-corruption protests 
Source: Author’s pictures
In Malta, the scandal first achieved public attention through 
journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia, whose blog is one of the most 
followed websites in Malta. Her suggestions were corroborated 
by the publication of the Panama Papers, the online leak of 
11,5 million documents belonging to the offshore law firm Mos-
sack Fonseca.
It transpired that Energy and Health Minister Konrad Mizzi and 
Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff Keith Schembri had set up com-
panies in Panama shortly after entering office, following the 2013 
general election. It also transpired that the accountant responsible 
for opening these companies also opened a third one, Egrant, the 
mystery owner of which had the name so sensitive that it could 
only be disclosed through Skype, rather than in writing.
The Panama Papers issue hit the Maltese headlines for the 
coming months. Protests were held, there were calls for resigna-
tions, and allegations on the ownership of Egrant were running 
haywire. Many were questioning whether Prime Minister Muscat 
could be its ultimate owner.
On April 20th 2017, Daphne Caruana Galizia claimed that the 
ultimate owner of Egrant was Muscat’s wife Michelle. Literally, all 
Malta was glued to the television and the social media to discuss 
this shocker. And in the midst of it all, an Iranian bank owner’s ‘great 
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escape’ was filmed live on TV. Was he escaping with documents 
related to the allegations?
According to the Russian whistleblower, the bank in question, 
Pilatus Bank, was involved in the Egrant transactions by holding 
accounts for shell companies belonging to Michelle Muscat, 
Konrad Mizzi and Keith Schembri, and to no one less than the 
Azeri president’s daughter Leyla Aliyeva. Incidentally, Azerbaijan 
has a major stake in the Maltese Government’s new energy policy. 
The former’s state oil company is a shareholder in Malta’s new 
power station.
Joseph Muscat called for the Magisterial inquiry, but the Pilatus 
escape had already happened. Panama Papers had now gone in 
overdrive mode and opposition leader Simon Busuttil made new 
allegations: he stated that Muscat’s chief of staff, Keith Schembri, 
accepted bribes from the sale of Maltese passports to rich Russians.
Rumors of a snap election were in place and they came true 
during May Day, when Joseph Muscat announced the election to be 
held on June 3, thus cutting government’s legislature to four years 
out of the usual five. All of this was happening despite having a big 
parliamentary majority.
During the electoral campaign, the Nationalist Party’s main 
message was against corruption, stating that in a normal European 
Anti-corruption protests 
Source: Author’s pictures
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democracy the institutions would long have taken an action against 
those involved in Panama Papers. The independent media has also 
focused very much on governance, in what turned out to be one of 
the most controversial general elections in recent Maltese political 
history. There were high expectations that more information would 
be published on Egrant, but they did not materialize.
Post-Truth Society
Yet remarkably, Labour won comfortably. The Egrant political liability 
was turned into an asset, with Labour’s narrative of ‘where’s the 
proof’ becoming stronger and stronger. Whereas Keith Schembri’s 
and Konrad Mizzi’s involvement in Panama Papers was crystal clear, 
the ownership of Egrant was subject to debate. It is an example of 
the post-truth society, if Malta ever needed one.
Surely, Egrant alone cannot explain Labour’s electoral victory. 
But it does show that governance and corruption, important as 
they are, are not necessarily the most important issues for certain 
electorates, such as that of Southern European Malta. An immediate 
question comes to mind: how can a political party that believes in 
transparency and good governance reconcile this with the main 
aspirations of the electorate? This is surely a question that Malta’s 
opposition will have to face in the immediate future.
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 Latvia: An Ongoing Fight
Since regaining its independence, The Republic of Latvia (further 
on — Latvia) has been systematically developing and improving 
its judiciary, political system, and public administration to further 
integrate itself into the Western world and improve the well-being 
of its citizens. Nonetheless, numerous needed reforms and laws 
guaranteeing and protecting equal rights and freedoms have not 
been passed due to lack of political will or poor public administra-
tion (or perhaps both). And in the era of the rise of populism, these 
advances seem more and more distant and unrealistic if nothing 
changes in the political scene of the country.
Latvia proved to itself and to the rest of the world that it is capa-
ble of high level leadership and performance during its Presidency 
of the Council of the European Union in 2015, focusing on, among 
other things, stronger economy, more digitalized society, and the 
EU’s relations with its neighbours within the Eastern Partnership 
framework 1.
A dedicated member of the EU and NATO, Latvia has marked 
yet another milestone by joining the OECD in 2016. Here the visual 
success story can be paused. A year after joining the OECD, Latvia 
still has not implemented many crucial points of the guidelines 
agreed upon during the accession negotiations. The long promised 
and talked-about Health System reform still has not been carried 
out in 2017, with the doctors’ associations and unions on strike for 
months now, demanding fair working hours and adequate salary. 
The long promised Law on Whistleblower Protection that has been 
on the table since 2014 has not been passed yet. At the moment, 
Latvia remains the last member state of the European Union that 
has not ratified the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and 
combating violence against women and domestic violence, locally 
known as the Istanbul Convention.
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Society’s unity, tolerance and attidute towards different social groups in Latvia
Research done in 2014 by the research center SKDS. Source: CKDS (2014)
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Ultra-Right Attacks
The Ministry of Justice has been led by the representatives of the 
ultra-right National Alliance for years. This conservative party 
blocks any attempt to grant equal rights to all citizens of Latvia and 
to protect them from domestic violence. The current Minister for 
Justice, Dzintars Rasnačs, uses culture, tradition, and the Constitu-
tion as pretext to deny necessary reforms: “The convention obliges 
countries to renounce discrimination not only on the basis of sex, 
but also on the basis of ‘gender’. In order to comply with this prin-
ciple of non-discrimination, sooner or later Latvia will have to start 
construing Article 110 of the Constitution and the second paragraph 
of Article CL 35 in light of the sociological theory of ‘gender’. This 
means authorizing same-sex marriages even without amending 
the wording of the first sentence of Article 110 of the Constitution,” 
the minister warned. “ 2
Change from the Bottom
The same ill logic is ardently supported by the natural counterparts 
of the National Alliance — a social democratic, pro-Russia party 
Concord. Despite ideological differences, both parties work closely 
together to oppose the Istanbul Convention and any attempts to 
introduce the Cohabitation Law agreement; furthermore these 
parties pushed through the so-called Virtue Law back in 2015, highly 
influencing the educational methods of teachers and their adher-
ence to the “traditional moral values”.
With all the above mentioned developments in mind, the country 
has spent much of 2016 and the first half of 2017 getting ready for 
the Municipal elections. Normally, not a popular event in the political 
life in Latvia, this year’s municipal elections, especially in the major 
cities, were viewed as a chance to change the current political tide 
of corruption and hypocritical traditions. Though in the majority of 
municipalities the governing parties prevailed, new political forces 
entered the political scene for the first time. The joint list of the local 
liberal party Latvijas Attīstībai and its partners from regional party 
LRA came second in Riga, ensuring liberal representation in the Riga 
municipality. Another winner of the elections is the underdog JKP — 
a conservative party bearing much resemblance with the Polish PiS 
party. Used-to-be underdogs are leading the opposition’s agenda in 
the Riga municipality and putting constant pressure on the Concord 
party, which has won the elections but now has two seats less.
Such results had been forecasted before the elections; there-
fore, the Concord party came up with a plan to secure the majority 
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for the new mandate. Right before the elections (at the end of the 
previous mandate), the Concord party pushed through amendments 
to its internal main provision on composition of committees of the 
municipality. Originally granting proportional representation for 
all elected parties, the amended regulations allocate a specific 
number of seats per party, thus constantly granting at least one vote 
majority for the Concord party. This dubious move poses a test for 
relations between the municipal and national-level governments, 
especially between the Concord-led Riga municipality and the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Development 
(the ministry overseeing work of regional municipalities). At the mo-
ment, the ministry has called the municipality’s move illegal and has 
demanded to cancel the amendment. It is unclear how the issue will 
be settled, but this is indeed a test for Constitutionalism in Latvia. 3
Right after the election results, the outgoing city council with the 
strong majority of Concord party has amended the main provision 
and regulations of the municipality administration in order to secure 
their position in the next term of office. This event is another test for 
Constitutionalism in Latvia. Admitted as against the law, the move 
cannot be easily overturned and it is yet unclear how the national 
government and responsible institutions will react.
Cementery Tram
While equal rights are being denied to the LGBTIQ community 
and gender equality and domestic violence are still topical issues, 
we can observe a positive change in the civil society, which is 
developing significantly despite the political will and agenda of the 
governing political forces. There is a rise of active NGOs and citizen 
initiatives fighting for freedom, equal rights, and against corruption. 
2016 and 2017 have seen a rise in public actions starting from 
Sisters March, conversation festival LAMPA 4, protests against the 
government and the Attorney General (especially after the Oligarch 
case), to guerrilla city actions when activists painted bicycle path 
lines onto the main street in Riga, proving that there is space for all 
sorts of transportations in spite of municipality authorities’ opinion 5. 
One of the biggest scandals was connected to the so called 
Cemetery Tram (#kaputramvajs) — Riga municipality’s project to 
introduce a new tram line using the EU fund for degraded territories. 
Although the city needs new tram lines in some of its districts, the 
proposed route did not seem to solve the connectivity problem, 
while intruding into the cemetery territory and suggesting multiple 
trees chop off. Activists fiercely fought the plan with public actions 
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and protests. Another unexpected victory is the ban on using wild 
animals in circuses — a result on an active protests and lobbying 
of an animal activist NGO. While the development of an active civil 
society is an obvious advantage of the last two years, this is not 
a proper checks and balances system.
An ongoing fight for equal rights includes a citizens’ initiative for 
the introduction of the Cohabitation agreement. The law proposal 
would thus enable rights for same-sex couples, as well as protect 
other unregistered families. At the moment unmarried couples 
have no legal protection; nonetheless, in 2017 Latvian banks have 
started to demand that their clients provide information about 
their “unmarried partners”, too. The same was asked from the state 
officials when filling their annual declarations. This leaves unmarried 
couples with no rights but duties. The Cohabitation law would solve 
this problem. Citizens can sign the petition for the law proposal on 
the citizens’ initiative platform manabals.lv. After 10,000 signatures 
are gathered under the initiative, it will be passed to the Parliament, 
which will have to review it. At the moment, the initiative has been 
signed by more than 8,000 people, but with different institutions 
putting pressure on unmarried couples, it is predicted that the sig-
natures will be collected before the autumn of 2018, namely before 
the next national elections, so that MPs show their stance on this 
highly emotionally loaded topic. The current centre-right govern-
ment has clearly stated that they shall not grant rights to same-sex 
couples, but this might change if the issue becomes a topic in the 
electoral campaigns.
The rest of the 2017 will be marked by the government’s in-
ability to carry out Health System and Tax reforms. The country’s 
Constitutionalism and Political System are put to a major test by 
the so called Oligarch case: the publication of leaked conversa-
tions between politicians and businessmen showing the level of 
corruption in the political elites. With current ministers and various 
officials involved, the leaked conversations show the urgent need 
for implementation of good governance principles, paralleled with 
increased transparency of the lobby sector, a Judiciary reform, and 
protection of the freedom of speech and the media. Since the Oli-
garch case has been developing since July 2017, it will be the subject 
of a thorough analysis for next year’s review.
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 Should the right 
to vote be extended 
in the Grand Duchy?
Luxembourg is the second smallest but wealthiest Member State 
of the European Union. It has a population of over 500,000 people, 
which makes it one of the least-populated countries is Europe. 
Unquestionably, Luxembourg is one of the leaders in democracy im-
plementation in Europe and its exclusive best practices serve as an 
example to the developed world. According to Sustainable Govern-
ance Indicators (SGI), Luxembourg falls into the upper-middle ranks 
internationally (rank 13) in terms of democracy 1. However, thorough 
monitoring of the main components of Luxembourg’s democracy re-
veals particular doubts, raising the necessity of further examination. 
If the legislative framework and practical impact are monitored, one 
may conclude that certain gaps occur within the well-acknowledged 
democracy standards of this benchmark country. According to the 
academia, a democracy deficit occurs when ostensibly democratic 
organizations or institutions (particularly governments) fall short of 
fulfilling the principles of democracy in their practices or operation 
where representative and linked parliamentary integrity becomes 
widely discussed 2. After analyzing the publicly available databases 
in the context of existing international challenges, we decided to 
focus on the problem of voting rights and citizenship acquisition in 
the context of the current constant migration.
Land of immigration
The official portal of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg describes Lux-
embourg as a country of immigration. From a historical perspective, 
the population of Luxembourg has rapidly grown throughout the 20th 
and 21st century reaching the number it sustains nowadays. This 
vast increase represents a result of immigration processes stem-
ming from the country’s substantial economic development in vari-
ous industries, complemented by relevant supporting governmental 
initiatives. The population of Luxembourg now comprises even more 
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than 47% non-Luxembourg nationals (Figure 1). On the other hand, 
migrants and cross-border commuters constitute 80% of the labor 
force in the private sector and, according to experts, are the main 
driving force of the national economy 3.
In the context of the existing legislative framework of Luxem-
bourg, voting is compulsory only for those who are nationals of 
Luxembourg. Moreover, they must be at least 18 years old on the 
election day, listed on the electoral register maintained by the 
government and have full civil and political rights 4. Since 1999, 
European Union (EU) citizens (representing 90% of the country’s 
population) are allowed to cast their vote in municipal and 
European elections 5. Since 2005, the non-EU citizens have the 
right to participate in municipal elections only provided that they 
fulfill certain residency requirements 6 and are registered on the 
electoral list 7.
While the extension of the right to vote in municipal elections to 
non-Luxembourg nationals is perceived as a step in good direction 
for the democratic society, the lack of such right in the national 
elections is highly disputable.
Land of the silent
As mentioned earlier, almost half of the population of the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg comprises foreigners living and working in 
Luxembourg but still not entitled to vote in the national elections. 
Source: STATEC
© Statista 2017
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Taking into account the fact that voting is obligatory in the country, 
we came to the conclusion that only half of its citizens participate in 
the political life and decision-making.
The issue triggered a national debate on the possibility of 
granting the right to vote in national elections to foreigners legally 
working and living on the territory of Luxembourg. On 7 June 2015, 
the country’s Parliament held a referendum on whether the voting 
right in national elections should be extended to foreign citizens 
who have lived in the country for more than 10 years. The vast 
majority of voters (constituting almost 78%) responded to this 
question negatively 8. The outcome of said referendum, however not 
surprising, resulted in a lively discussion across Europe and nega-
tive commentaries in the media 9.
There is no doubt that what happened in Luxembourg in 2015 
might have turned out to be a political precedence. Had the voters 
responded positively to the governmental proposition, Luxembourg 
would have become the first European Union Member State to 
grant foreigners residing in the country the right to vote in all its 
elections 10. However, due to an opposite outcome, the referendum 
held in 2015 was assessed by experts as a “failed modernization 
 attempt,” 11 which underlined the disconnection between eligibility 
and national citizenship, which half of the country’s population 
does not possess.
To address the created obvious democratic deficit, the same 
year the government proposed a bill filling in the existing political 
participation gaps 12. Although it was subject to discussions and 
partial resistance of some of the Members of the Parliament 13, the 
law entered into force on 1 April 2017 creating an easier procedure to 
obtain Luxembourgish citizenship 14.
Thus, we may conclude that the overall conditions for exercising 
voting rights in Luxembourg have been eased over the last years 
due to the recent steps undertaken by the national government. 
However, it is too early to evaluate the real impact of the adopted 
measures, especially taking into account the fact that the next na-
tional elections are expected in October 2018. Therefore, it remains 
an open question whether amending the citizenship procedure will 
be a sufficient solution to tackle all voting aspects of the existing 
democracy deficit of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
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html Access date: 21.10.2017
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division in the country. Source: Luxem-
burger Wort (2017). New Luxembourg 
nationality law passes parliament. 
Available at: https://www.wort.lu/en/
luxembourg/vote-on-thursday-new-
luxembourg-nationality-law-passes-
parliament-589dc051a5e74263e-
13aa60a Access date: 21.10.2017
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 Skin Deep Lithuanian 
Democracy and the Fight for 
the Overtaken Municipalities
Lithuania is indeed an example of a successful post-soviet transition. 
Unlike many other post-communist societies, Lithuania managed to 
transform its economy into a well-functioning part of the European 
market, join European Union and NATO, and avoid the emergence of 
authoritarianism. Nonetheless, the beauty of Lithuanian democracy 
is only skin deep. The state still has serious problems with corrup-
tion, low level of civic engagement into politics, relatively high level 
of homophobia and racism, nepotism, cronyism, clientelism, and 
similar. Each respective issue is extremely complex and should be 
discussed in a separate article. This article focuses on the problem 
of so-called overtaken municipalities, a phenomenon which encom-
passes most of the previously mentioned democracy flaws.
Overtaking mechanism
While discussing the state of democracy in Lithuania’s regions, 
famous Lithuanian political scientist Ainė Raimonaitė compared 
it to an apple which is shiny from the outside, but rotten from the 
inside. She compares the situation in some of these municipalities 
to Belarus — a country often referred to as the last dictatorship in 
Europe. To describe these municipalities, the scientist uses the term 
of overtaken municipalities. 1
When describing the concept of overtaken municipalities, the 
researchers firstly talk about the administrative areas where 
local interest-groups challenge the central government. To fulfill 
their goals, these groups employ the same symbolic and material 
resources as the state, such as political mandates, budget assigna-
tions, community networks, and so forth. While the competition of 
ideas and interests forms the core of democracy, cases of over-
taken municipalities are the examples of how measures of survival 
politics, 2 political machine technologies, 3 and post-soviet heritage 
turn this competition into a malformation of democracy.
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The analysis of Šalčininkai municipality has shown that shady 
practices of the survival politics are being implemented there. Local 
leaders appoint loyalists for the important positions and ensure the 
circumstances for their swift dismissal in case they build up compet-
ing loyalist groups. Local leaders also apply vote trafficking during 
the general election, threatening, blackmailing, belittling in the media 
they control, and firing the opponents or “undesirable” people. They 
further exercise their powers to paralyze the work of opposing local 
institutions by starting endless audits and perpetually changing 
the law. Finally, local leaders avoid the personal responsibility at all 
costs and seek for the balance of power in the administrative area 
they dominate. All of these practices are either illegal or seriously 
contradict the ideas of free competition. They are more commonly 
associated with democratically underdeveloped regions.
The other outlined pattern of counter-democratic activities in 
Šalčininkai is related with the establishment of power through the 
clientelist networks. The mobilization of dominant Labor Party is 
based on the disproportionate attention to the poorest and creating 
material benefits for those who belong to the party. These incen-
tives may encompass an improved access to the organized leisure 
activities, a possibility to be appointed for a better position at work, 
or an insurance of securing the current occupation. These practices 
are also known as a creation of political machine in which public 
resources are used as a tool of patronage and resemble feudal 
social relationships.
On the top of survival politics and political machine technologies, 
researchers find the layer of practices that are clearly inherited 
from the former regime of the Soviets. These practices are mostly 
related to the effort to appeal to electorate’s longing for a strong-
hand governor, with the old-fashioned public relations that empha-
size participation in all the local events and shaking the hands of 
common people, and with the struggle to control the local press. 
Together with survival politics and political machines, communist 
heritage forms the overtaking mechanism that is keenly used by the 
regional politicians in Lithuania.
The scale of the phenomenon
Although the research examined a single case of Šalčininkai, the 
phenomenon of overtaken municipalities is widely spread in Lithua-
nia. Romas Sadauskas-Kvietkevičius, a blogger and member of the 
city council in Druskininkai, which has been controlled by Social 
Democrats since 2000, describes the situation in the municipality 
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as extremely difficult from democratic point of view. According to 
him, only “suicides or pensioners with a taste for extreme adven-
tures” can allow themselves to get involved with politics. For the 
 opposition activists, it is almost impossible to find a job or run their 
own business. Without breaking any laws, the ones in power will 
make sure to create obstacles for a business, so that their owners 
think twice before deciding if it is worth to cause oneself problems 
by employing a troublemaker, says Sadauskas-Kvietkevičius.
The authors of the previously discussed research point at 
4 municipalities where every indicator of overtaking mechanism 
is present. Although Druskininkai does not formally meet all the 
indicators, Lithuanian media often refers to it and numerous other 
municipalities as “principalities governed by the local dukes”. If the 
number of the municipalities, where the local administration is 
not changing for three or more terms, is added up to the ones 
highlighted by the scientists, a total amount of 18 (36%) out of 60 
municipalities in Lithuania seem to fall into this category.
Although the populations of these municipalities form only 18% of  
the overall Lithuanian population, the fact that every parliamentary 
party can be under suspicion for taking over at least one municipal-
ity raises a reasonable concern about the state of Lithuanian 
democracy.
Is there a way out?
Recently, an institutional reform, which introduced the direct 
election of mayors, took place in Lithuania. Some political scientists 
expected this reform to end the domination of regional dukes. For  
example, Vytautas Dunbliauskas argued that “[before the reform, lo-
cal leaders] had to please the leadership of the parties, as so-called 
dukes were elected by the councils of municipalities; therefore, the 
vote was only formal, whereas now, they will have to show charisma 
for the whole local population.” Despite good intentions of the re-
form, the situation improved only to a limited extent. Although 5 out 
of 18 former dukes were not re-elected during the regional elections 
of 2015 and 82% of Lithuanians consider such reform to be neces-
sary, the situation in some of the municipalities has even worsened. 
After various scandals in Durskininkai and Lazdijai, the local mayors 
were asked to stop their memberships in Social Democrat and 
Conservative parties. If previously internal disciplinary measures 
of parties were effective, this time local dukes rebelled against their 
own parties and led the secessions of the local party branches from 
the mother parties. The impetus for the self-confidence of local 
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dukes was ultimately given by the fresh victories in direct local elec-
tion and through total control of their administrated municipalities.
Instantly after the reform had come into power, two new 
prescriptions were discussed. The first one was to introduce the 
limit for the number of terms that mayors could take. While it would 
encourage internal competition within the ruling parties in over-
taken municipalities, the wider effect should not be expected as this 
innovation would only reshuffle the influence among the dominant 
players. The access for currently marginalized actors would still not 
be allowed. This problem might be solved by the second set of ideas, 
which emphasizes a necessity to strengthen the opposition. One 
of the possible ways to do this is by giving the status of vice-mayor 
to the leader of opposition. Currently, members of municipality 
councils in Lithuania are not paid for their service — turning politics 
into a side activity for most of the local politicians. Such situation 
does not allow the opposition to better coordinate its actions and 
positions, but it is not impossible to solve it. If the opposition had 
a leader who would have the means to turn politics into his primary 
concern, a change would be achievable.
Besides the institutional changes, the situation might be 
improved by invoking of more grass-root measures. More attention 
Share of potentially overtaken municipalities
17
Number  
of taken-over-
municipalities
42 
Number of healthy 
municipalities
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from national and international NGOs, parties, media, and individual 
officials might raise local population’s awareness about counter-
democratic tendencies and illegal practices in their municipalities. 
As a matter of fact, Lithuanian media is taking a significant part 
in these efforts. The major media outlets are constantly putting 
regional issues on the spotlight. Although there is a huge share of 
people, who do not follow media channels online, these outlets are 
an important source for breaking the monopoly of information that 
local leaders are trying to create in the overtaken municipalities. 
It is possible that the investigative journalism, instead of institutional 
reforms, have made an impact in 5 municipalities, where the voters 
rejected local dukes from holding power. Politicians, who operate on 
the national level, often emphasize the existences of this problem. 
NGOs, such as Open Lithuania Foundation, have also started to 
target the problematic areas with their democracy promotion 
projects. Another NGO called “Baltosios pirštinės” (literal translation: 
The White Gloves) started unifying active Lithuanians in the effort 
to stop trafficking votes and played an important role in publishing 
the registered cases during the last few elections. It looks like 
Lithuanian political system and society are resilient enough to deal 
with the challenges for their young democracy. Nonetheless, the de-
fenders of democracy have to be aware that democracy in Lithuania, 
as in most of the countries in post-soviet space, is still an ongoing 
process and not the finite product.
1 The meaning of the term is broader 
discussed in the research of her stu-
dents at Vilnius University.
2 The politics of survival is a term 
offered by Joel S. Migdal in his work 
“State in Society: studying how 
states and societies transform and 
constitute one another” (pp. 71—84). 
While analyzing local leaderships in 
African countries, he found that they 
actively try to regulate domestic 
political competition through the 
creation of balance of power, the dirty 
tricks against the critics and  
political competitors, and the use of 
other undemocratic measures.
3 Vilnius university researchers 
use the term of political machine to 
describe the creation of patronage 
networks that turn the local politics 
into a mare exchange in services. 
For example, votes are traded into the 
access to social-security benefits.
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Local leaders also apply 
vote trafficking during the 
general election, threatening, 
blackmailing, belittling 
in the media they control, 
and firing the opponents 
or “undesirable” people.
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 From the zeniths of the Celtic 
Tiger to one of the worst banking 
crises in the history of the EU
From the zeniths of the Celtic Tiger to one of the worst banking cri-
ses in the history of the EU, the Republic of Ireland is fast emerging 
as a country of extremes.
While the country is currently basking in the glow of what 
economic commentators have described as the “Celtic Phoenix”, 
the harsh years of recession left in their wake a country deeply 
polarised.
Spike
According to data collated by Knight Frank, a wealth analysis firm, 
Ireland now has 83,100 citizens with assets worth over $1,000,0000. 
The firm predicts the number of millionaires in the country to 
exceed 100,000 by 2026. Experts claim the increase is directly linked 
to a dramatic spike in Ireland’s property prices.
As rent’s rise and property owners sell to Buy to Let investors, 
those unable to climb the country’s increasing intangible property 
market, face skyrocketing rents which has led to one of the worst 
housing crises in the history of the state.
According to figures published last May by the property website 
Daft.ie, the average cost for a rental property in Ireland is €1,131 per 
month, with rents in the capital Dublin averaging at €1,690. In just 
one year the average Irish monthly rental rate increased by €134 per 
month with most market value rents increasing by 50% in the last 
four years.
For many families in the country recovering from years of reces-
sion, the increasing rents soak up any disposable income. Despite 
the county’s relative general economic robustness, large sections 
of Irish society remain in poverty leading to a polarized society and 
a burgeoning wealth gap.
At the same time as Ireland creates more millionaires, 
3,000 children are now accessing the country’s emergency 
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accommodation services. According to figures released by Focus 
Ireland, a Charity helping Ireland’s homeless, the number of 
homeless people in Ireland rose by over 40% between the years 
2013 and 2016, years the country was alleged to be experiencing an 
economic rebirth. During this period the demand on the county’s 
small number of foodbanks reached a level where Crosscare, 
an NGO providing food for those in need, established community 
banks and a “card” system to meet demand.
Concentration
In contrast to the poverty experienced by those left behind during 
Ireland’s recession and subsequent recovery, Ireland’s wealthy 
continue to expand their influence. The county’s third wealthiest 
man Dennis O’Brien managed to consolidate his influence in the 
country’s largest newspaper group Independent News Media (INM), 
which holds a myriad of regional and national titles. O’Brien owns 
29,9% of INM and owns Comunicorp which holds Newstalk and TV3 
the only main rivals to the state broadcaster RTE. This year Ireland 
slid from 9th to 14th place on the Press Freedom Index published by 
Reporters without Borders. The organisation cited high levels of 
concentration of media ownership.
The Irish state has failed to play a regulatory role in both the 
Irish housing crisis and Ireland’s ailing media climate. One in five of 
Ireland’s TD (MPS) are landlords and Ireland’s current ruling political 
party Fine Gael have failed to offer any solution to the country’s 
housing crisis aided by the ever growing number of lenders offering 
high interest buy-to-let mortgages. The government’s failure to build 
adequate public housing is a source of concern as Dublin remains 
a popular migration destination for tech workers drawn to the 
multinational companies using Dublin as their HQ for tax purposes. 
The state’s failure to invest in rural Ireland has also drawn people 
from the countryside to Dublin seeking employment, decimating 
populations on the western seaboard. Failure to regulate the buy to 
let market and failure to build social housing show the state’s vested 
interest in Ireland’s latest property bubble.
In addition, Ireland’s wealthy elite continue to prosper disman-
tling the nation’s one vibrant “fifth estate” litigating successfully 
against journalists who criticize while forging intimate relationships 
with political leaders. Those who control Ireland’s newspapers are 
afforded lucrative government contracts, including O’Brien who 
a tribunal found paid former minister for Communications Michael 
Lowry in exchange for information, that aided his acquisition of 
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Ireland’s second mobile phone license. Lowry is the former chair-
man of Fine Gael, Ireland’s ruling party.
As Ireland recovers from collapse, questions remain as the coun-
try’s poorly regulated property market spirals out of control once 
again, a leading factor in the country’s dive into recession. It seems 
likely given the country’s current political leadership, Ireland is 
destined to repeat its mistakes as voters choose between the two 
main centre right parties and a fragmented opposition.
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As rent’s rise and property 
owners sell to Buy to Let 
investors, those unable to  
climb the country’s increasing 
intangible property market, 
face skyrocketing rents which 
has led to one of the worst 
housing crises in the history 
of the state.
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The Netherlands #representation #elections
A radical democratic perspective 
on Dutch Democracy
In the debate on democratic deficit in Europe, the Netherlands is 
usually not a country that pops up when we think about European 
countries with a flawed democracy. Instead, it is often perceived 
as a democratic example to the rest of the continent. According to 
the Democracy Index of The Economist, the Netherlands is not only 
a Full Democracy, a democracy where civil liberties and political 
freedoms are not only respected but also enforced by the political 
culture, but also one of the most democratic countries in Europe, 
ranking only after the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland.
It would, however, be misplaced to view the Netherlands as 
a country that is democratically speaking rather perfect. A case 
could even be made that in the recent past, the Netherlands has 
become less democratic instead of more. In this contribution I will 
focus on some of the flaws that could be identified with the Dutch 
democracy, and why they are problematic.
The Netherlands could be described as a liberal democracy. 
A liberal democracy is made up of two strands: (constitutional) 
liberalism and democracy. Liberalism stands for the rule of law, the 
separation of powers and the protection of basic liberties. Democ-
racy on the other hand is about a political system that includes 
free and fair elections, power to the people and a representative 
government. If we take the democratic strand of liberal democracy 
into consideration we can identify five democratic flaws in the 
Netherlands. 
Party cartel
The first flaw is the fact that the highest ranking official in the 
municipal government, the mayor, is not directly elected by the 
population of the municipality. In the Dutch system, it is the head 
of state, the King, who names the mayor, based on advice of the 
Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, who usually follows 
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the nomination of the municipal council. Citizens do not have a say 
in this procedure. This procedure has many problems, including the 
fact that most of the mayors in the Netherlands come from three 
political parties: the Christian Democrats (CDA), the Labour Party 
(PvdA) and the Conservative Liberals (VVD). At this moment, these 
three parties together have only 40% of the seats in the Parliament. 
Thus, in many municipalities, the political colour of the mayor does 
not match the average political views of its citizens. It is a limited 
number of political parties, and not the citizens, who decide who 
will become mayor in the Netherlands, a construction that has been 
named the party cartel (partijkartel). 1 The newly formed government 
has, however, stated that it wants to change the Constitution, thus 
enabling the possibility of direct election of mayors in the near 
future. In the past, however, attempts to reform this system have 
always failed.
Particracy
Related to this problem, there is a second deficit to democracy in 
the Netherlands, namely the fact that a case could be made that 
instead of a democracy, the Netherlands is actually a particracy. 
The term has been popularized in the Netherlands by Arnout Maat, 
a young intellectual and a former member of the Young Democrats, 
the youth wing of the Social Liberal Party (D66). In his book The 
Particracy (De Particratie) he argued that, instead of a democracy, 
the Netherlands could be described as a particracy because of the 
fact that instead of the people, it is the political parties who hold 
power. Citizens elect representatives of political parties, but it is the 
parties that are governing the country and make all the important 
political decisions. The problem with a particracy, according to Maat, 
is the fact that this system cannot be changed from the inside out. 
This would be like trying to repair a car while it is driving. 2
The third flaw of the Dutch democracy that can be identified 
here is related to the concept of the particracy. In the Dutch Parlia-
ment, the Senate and many municipal councils we can find a strong 
factional discipline. According to the Dutch Constitution, Members 
of Parliament are elected without being bound to the decisions of 
the party. The reality of the Parliament is, however, very different. 
Parties often tend to vote unanimously, and views, let alone votes, 
that defer from the party line are not at all appreciated. Political 
representatives, especially Members of Parliament, are therefore 
unable to function as independent actors who can judge a law or 
proposal on its merits. Instead they become an extension of the 
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party line, providing the party with even more power than it already 
has. At the same time, this creates dysfunction in a system in which 
political representatives are being elected in order to represent 
the views of the people who have elected them.
Furthermore, we are already experiencing another problem 
regarding the representation of the views of the Dutch citizens. Cur-
rently, there exists the possibility for citizens of calling for a consult-
ing, non-binding, referendum in the Netherlands, if they are able to 
collect enough signatures to support it. This possibility was created 
by the Parliament in the past to give citizens more direct influence 
on the democratic decision-making process. The new government 
coalition, however, is planning to repeal the current law, thus taking 
away the option of a consulting referendum. A referendum like this 
has taken place only once, about the association treaty with Ukraine, 
where the majority of voters voted against. 3 This experience, to-
gether with the result of the referendum on Brexit, has had a strong 
influence on the views of Dutch politicians on whether referenda are 
preferable or not. This has led to a political climate in which it seems 
that Dutch politicians dislike too much direct influence of the Dutch 
citizens over politics and government decision-making.
Degree Democracy
The final democratic deficit in The Netherlands that will be identified 
here is what has been described by two scholars, Mark Bovens 
and Anchrit Wille, as Degree Democracy (Diplomademocratie). 
The Netherlands is a country that is being governed by a Parliament 
in which approximately 90% of the MP’s hold a university degree. 
The average percentage of Dutch citizens that hold a university 
degree is growing, but not even close to a majority. At this moment, 
approximately 30% of the Dutch population have a university degree. 
Thus, the Netherlands is being governed by a group of people that 
stems in 90% from a part of the Dutch population that is not much 
larger than 30%. According to Bovens and Wille, this has led to 
a large gap between the political elite and the majority of the Dutch 
citizens, with the former no longer being able to understand what is 
going on in the hearts and minds of the latter, and the latter being 
no longer able to identify with the former. 4 Dutch democracy is 
therefore not fully representative, but rather a full representation 
of only a segment of the population.
Even though democracy in the Netherlands seems at the 
first hand to be healthy and strong — and to a large extent it is. 
There are a few problems with it, as have been identified above. 
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No democracy is perfect. They all have their deficits. The Dutch 
democratic deficits mainly lie in the sphere of the power that 
political parties have, the limited direct influence of citizens on the 
government, and the fact that politicians overwhelmingly stem from 
a small segment of the population only. There is no sign that the 
current situation will improve in the near future. As stated before, 
there is a possibility that in the coming years it will become possible 
to directly elect mayors. The correctional referendum on the other 
hand might become a thing of the past. Much has been written 
about the gap between the political elite and the government, and 
even though according to opinion polls trust in politicians and the 
government is still rather high in the Netherlands, there is also 
a strong undercurrent of mistrust of the political elite among the 
population, and a similar mistrust of the population among politi-
cians. This could possibly affect Dutch democracy in a negative 
way in the coming years, thus leading to an even larger democratic 
deficit than we are already experiencing right now.
 
 
1 These days the recently founded 
conservative Forum for Democ-
racy (FvD) is the leading critic of this 
system in Dutch politics. Originally, 
however, it was Hans van Mierlo, the 
founder of the social-liberal D66 who, 
already in the 1960s, criticized the 
party cartel.  
2 Arnout Maat, De Particratie (Soes-
terberg 2016).  
3 A good analysis of the referendum 
and its aftermath can be read on 
EUobserver: https://euobserver.com/
foreign/138060   
4 Mark Bovens & Anchrit Wille, Diplo-
mademocratie (Amsterdam 2014).  
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 The fight against 
corruption in Spain
Spain is not an old democracy. We experienced nearly four 
decades of dictatorship, and our Constitution is barely forty years 
old. In these past four decades, Spanish democracy had to face 
important challenges, both economic and political. We even suf-
fered an unsuccessful coup d’état that intended to restore a military 
regime. Nowadays, everyone considers democracy in Spain firmly 
consolidated, but there are still risks such as the rise of populism, 
high unemployment rate and corruption.
Unpunished corruption
There is, in my opinion, a clear connection between these three 
subjects. The rise of populism began precisely when old Spanish 
political parties were not able to solve economic problems anymore 
and the awareness of unpunished corruption became widespread. 
According to all polls, including the official ones made by CIS (Span-
ish: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas — Centre for Sociologi-
cal Research), unemployment is the largest concern for Spaniards, 
the second one being corruption.
It is quite obvious why unemployment should be an important 
concern for Spanish people as we have the second highest 
unemployment rate in the European Union. Only Greece has higher 
unemployment. On the other hand, at first sight it is not that obvious 
why Spanish people are so worried about corruption. Things that 
are relatively common in “corrupt countries” are unthinkable in 
Spain, as in other developed countries. For instance, trying to pay 
a bribe to a policeman in order to avoid a traffic fine would be just 
foolish in Spain. Nobody would even think of paying a bribe to a tax 
inspector to close a complicated tax audit or to a civil servant to 
influence him or her in any way.
In Spain, the idea of corruption is closely related to political is-
sues. I believe the fight against political corruption is one of the key 
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issues for the final consolidation of democracy in Spain. Of course, 
it is an important political challenge; but it will also have significant 
economic consequences. Doing business is easier in those coun-
tries where there are low corruption levels and a strong and agile 
judicial system. In those countries, there is stronger and healthier 
competition amongst companies. Unfortunately, we have much 
to improve in Spain in those matters.
According to the Spanish independent market supervisor, 
Comisión Nacional de Mercados y Competencia, the cost of corrup-
tion in public contracts only, due to the lack of proper competition, 
could be as high as 40,000 million euro, close to 4% of Spain’s GDP. 
These include direct costs, like extra money paid to suppliers, and 
indirect costs, those derived from promoting inefficient but “well con-
nected” companies instead of those most productive and efficient. 
But there are additional and less measurable costs, such as the 
popular lack of faith in the economic system, and even in democracy.
The problem of corruption in Spain aggravated during, and as 
a consequence of, the financial crisis. In a lot of developed countries, 
citizens were very angry because they had to pay more taxes, 
or suffer public expense cuts, while money was spent in “saving 
the banks”. The difference in Spain is that Spanish banks saved 
were a kind of “Building Societies” managed by politicians of the old 
Spanish political parties. Some of them were top-level politicians, 
such as former Spanish conservative deputy prime minister, and 
ex-IMF-Director, Rodrigo Rato, or former socialist deputy prime 
minister, Mr. Narcis Serra. According to the estimations of the 
Spanish Tribunal de Cuentas (Court of Auditors), the cost of the 
Spanish rescue of these “building societies” was 60,000 million euro. 
Of course, part of the problem was plain bad management rather 
than corruption, but some of the top officials and politicians at these 
“building societies” have been indicted and even convicted for unfair 
management offences.
Independent judicial system?
However, the response of the judiciary system has not been enough 
to solve these corruption problems, in the opinion of a majority 
of Spanish society. The Spanish judiciary system is considered 
very slow according to all polls. Spain has one of the poorest ratios 
of judges per citizen in Europe. This is also the case of the ratio 
of tax administration employees per citizen, which is key in the fight 
against financial corruption. This is due to the lack of investment 
in these crucial areas.
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The lack of independence of the judiciary is also a big problem 
when it comes to investigating politicians. There is no problem 
with judicial independence in general, but there is a big issue 
of “politicization” in some key places. On the one hand, political 
parties choose, based on a partisan voting system, “Consejo 
General del Poder Judicial”, a professional council that oversees 
the judiciary system in Spain. On the other hand, the Government 
freely chooses the Fiscal General, a figure akin to an Attorney Gen-
eral or a General Prosecutor; and the incumbent Fiscal General 
has made very controversial decisions in investigations relating 
to the party currently in government.
Liberal reforms
Ciudadanos, a Spanish liberal party, has taken some action in order 
to escalate the fight against corruption. In our budgetary agreement 
with the conservative Popular Party, currently in government, we 
have achieved the first budgetary increase, since the beginning of 
the financial crisis, for the Tax Administration. Also, there will be 
a “crash plan” funded with over 100 million euro to improve the digi-
talization of the justice administration, a key point to make it faster.
Furthermore, we have promoted an Integral Law against Cor-
ruption, which is now processed in the Spanish Congress. In our 
proposal, we provide legal protection to “whistleblowers” who 
inform the authorities of corrupt practices. We also propose the 
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establishment of an independent authority for public integrity with 
important powers to prevent corrupt practices in all Spanish admin-
istrations. In this law we harden the penalties for corrupt practices, 
and we also change the rules to prevent conflicts of interest.
The most complicated area is the necessary, but difficult due 
to the resistance of the old parties, change to the judiciary ruling 
body in order to ensure judiciary independence, especially in cases 
related to corruption in political parties. We have also found very 
fierce resistance against our proposal to ensure the autonomy 
of public prosecutors in cases of political corruption. However, 
we will maintain our positions regarding these two key proposals.
In order to improve general living conditions, and prevent wrong 
populist doctrines to succeed, we have to promote economic re-
forms but also consolidate democracy, and fight effectively against 
corruption. This is our goal and we believe we are making progress 
in Spain in this respect.
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 A Democratic Gordian Knot
Greece’s problems cannot be individually termed as unique, nor 
are they unknown in other countries. What is unique is the fact 
that when seen collectively, they interlock and create an almost 
impenetrable wall of democratic deficit, which leaves citizens ripe 
for demagogues and extreme views.
A modern democracy functions with three separate authorities: 
legislative, executive and judiciary. It is thought that with this sepa-
ration of powers, if there is a deficit in one, the checks and balances 
from the other two branches will even things out. What happens, 
however, when all three branches are deficient?
Legislative
The legislative branch in Greece is the Greek Parliament. 
Traditionally, Greek laws have not followed the qualitative rules set, 
and as early as in the 1960s, there was a perception that laws were 
exceptionally poor. This has been taken to a whole new level during 
the times of the Greek Crisis and the Troika supervision. These two 
issues are among three main problems in Greece described below:
It is unconstitutional in Greece to put provisions in laws which 
have nothing to do with the main issue the law addresses. This has 
been systematically ignored (in 1975 the percentage of unrelated 
provisions dealing with regulatory issues reached 33—40%), but 
has reached huge proportions in the current administration, with 
laws now not just containing unrelated provisions, but completely 
unrelated topics. One example is Law 4373/16, which deals with the 
harmonization of Greek legislature with doping control issues, but 
also contains a provision for the payment of a special consumption 
tax for the development of the art of cinema. It is calculated that 
presently only 24% of laws now being passed have a single issue, 
with the other 76% having provisions dealing with issues completely 
unrelated to the law. 
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A new problem consists in the use of special legislative tools, 
such as the Acts of Legislative Content and the Act of the Ministe-
rial Cabinet, tools which are supposed to be used as emergency 
procedures, as exceptional measures for force majeure situations. 
These have been used by governments during the Troika era in 
order to sidestep due diligence and the parliamentary debate dur-
ing lawmaking. In 2012, 28 such acts were passed in comparison with 
67 laws passed by normal means (the number of such acts passed 
in 2015 was 35).
The laws related to the Troika mandated agreements were 
lumped into a single law and sent to the Parliament in an expedited 
procedure with parliamentarians having less than 2—3 days to read 
through hundreds of pages of the law.
Executive
The executive in Greece has traditionally had a love-hate relationship 
with the Greek citizens. For decades, the government in power has 
used special privileges, appointment to the public sector, subsidies 
and control of the bureaucratic apparatus to do favors, while at the 
legislative branch 
 poor quality of laws
 large quantity of laws
 laws dealing with irrelevant issues 
  abuse of non parliamentary means 
of legislation
judiciary branch 
  timely and non-effective adjudication 
for private citizens
  low level of independence to both 
the legislative and executive
executive branch 
  adds an additional layer of com plexity 
to laws via presidential decrees and 
ministerial decisions
  government and public sector decision 
making bodies intelocked
  complexity of organization and meth-
ods empoleyed lead to corruption 
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same time creating unfavorable conditions for those opposed to its 
ideological agenda. The government and the public sector in Greece 
work in tandem: each government has the right to appoint new gen-
eral directors and directors in the ministries, state owned businesses 
and other organizations related to governance or the State. It is cal-
culated that within Ministries, 20% of all departments are constituted 
from a manager and/or director, with attached staff. It should also be 
noted at the same time , Greece ranks 29 out of 31 rich democracies 
in the International Civil Service Effectiveness Index.
It also has a symbiotic relation to the legislature, using horrible 
lawmaking practices and building on them: it has been calculated 
that Greece has 4435 laws, which the executive has used to pass 
10 Presidential Decrees and 70 Ministerial Decisions, creating 
a huge morass of bureaucracy which is ripe for corruption.
Judiciary
The final remedy could be offered by the judiciary; but again, in 
Greece this is also a problematic sector. Greece is the slowest 
country out of the 28 EU countries in the adjudication of court 
cases. In a country which has 1 lawyer for every 315 citizens, there 
are 288,229 pending cases in court, 245,795 of which are being 
heard for the first time, and 42,434 which are in Appellate Court. 
In Greece, it takes on average 52 months from submitting a lawsuit 
for it to be adjudicated. And at the same time, the judiciary can 
hardly be considered to be independent from the other branches 
of government: High Justice Thanou, who just retired from presiding 
over the Supreme Court, was appointed to preside over the legal 
department for the Prime Minister’s office (although not illegal, this 
was considered to be highly irregular). At the same time, the anti-
corruption prosecution office has a zero budget with three district 
attorneys, when the estimated cost of corruption in Greece reaches 
20 billion euro annually.
This situation also affects other issues such as for instance free 
media and other liberties. Spurious laws are legislated, passed 
down to the executive, which further implements it via a morass 
of bureaucratic decisions and poor implementation. All this is left 
with little recourse from the judiciary, which is likely to stall to 
an extent to which justice is irrelevant by the time a decision is 
reached. This is further escalated by the Memoranda, which are 
implemented circumventing proper legislature and executive imple-
mentation, at times contradicting both the constitution and the law. 
Finally, all cases related to MPs must go through a parliamentary 
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committee to prosecute an MP, which almost never happens, lead-
ing to a further lack of accountability.
If you mix all of this together, the citizen in Greece is left with 
little support. The solution? That of the Gordian Knot. What is 
needed are targeted reforms of all 3 branches simultaneously, 
along with targeted spending which would actually enhance ef-
ficiency (it should be noted that quite a few of the reforms which 
have not been implemented in the Memoranda would have great 
positive effects if they had not been substituted with taxes and 
fiscal-equivalent measures).
One example includes the judiciary: it has been calculated in 
a study conducted by the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises that 
expenses for courts are 51 euro/citizen, while the EU average is 
79 euro; and that the slow adjudication of legal issues is the most 
severe issue holding back foreign investor. The study proposes 
specific measures which, if followed, would lead to savings of:
• 800,000 workdays
• 235 million euro for the Greek public sector
• up to 100% faster adjudication rate
Such studies have been conducted for all three branches, and 
could be implemented and unified in order to create a fast-paced 
radical reform package, which would lead to a better quality of 
democracy and a freer society and economy.
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Deep Roots of Crisis
The French Republic likes to present and represent itself as an 
established and self-confident democracy. However, freedoms in 
France are increasingly being violated, restricted, or circumscribed 
by the State as its sphere of action expands.
A cyclical threat: the excesses of the state of emergency
France, along with Ukraine and Turkey, is the third country to dero-
gate from the European Convention on Human Rights. The country 
has been living under a state of emergency since 14th of November 
2015, for almost two years now. In the course of the five laws extend-
ing the state of emergency, numerous provisions restricting freedoms, 
shifting the border between the judicial authority and the administra-
tive police, and weakening the rule of law have been adopted.
Some categories of people are particularly targeted, but it is 
society that suffers this restriction of rights. Measures restricting 
freedom of expression and association, permission for unauthorized 
searches of vehicles by police, the extensive possibilities of digital 
surveillance, house arrests, and searches at any time create a pic-
ture that is incompatible with a self-confident democracy.
These measures proved to be largely ineffective against terror-
ism, since only 0,3% of approximately 4,000 searches conducted 
without judicial authorization led to a judicial investigation for 
terrorism-related acts; they also have encouraged numerous 
abuses, since over 9% of complaints logged with the rights’ defender 
concluded that civil liberties have had been violated.
This seems to indicate a drift of French society towards a perma-
nent state of emergency. On 24 May 2017, the French Government 
presented a draft law intended to be implemented on 1st of Novem-
ber 2017, incorporating into ordinary law certain measures granting 
the administrative authorities extensive powers to combat terrorism, 
which have, so far, been covered by a right of exception.
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France’s state of emergency
The abuses related to the state of emergency are not the only 
threats against freedom in France: massive surveillance of personal 
communications with little judicial control, the fundamental rights 
of foreigners being regularly flouted 1, biased discriminatory ID 
control by Police  2, etc. are also of concern.
More generally, there has been an increase in intolerant political 
discourse. Certain segments of the population are treated as scape-
goats, while at the same time, individual freedoms are reduced and 
police powers are strengthened; particularly those that are relevant 
to minorities.
Underlying structural weaknesses
The recent setbacks in human rights, in the country which likes to 
think of itself as “the country of human rights”, are encouraged by 
some deep weaknesses in French institutions and culture.
The French media expresses a wide range of opinions, but the 
French state still has an important influence in the media sphere. 
It is established through control of many public radio and television 
channels and close links between politicians, defense contractors, 
and owners of media groups. In addition, in a difficult financial con-
text, the State provides indirect and direct subsidies to the press 
(Le Monde and Le Figaro each received 16 million euros of public 
subsidies in 2013).
The French legislator is one of the weakest in Europe. Because 
the President has comparatively greater powers (those of dissolving 
the National Assembly, appointing or dismissing a Prime minister, 
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or appealing directly to the people through referendums), it is dif-
ficult for a legislator to hold the government accountable.
The legislative branch of government is not alone in being weak 
vis-à-vis the executive branch. The European Court of Human Rights 
criticizes the French justice system for its lack of independence 3. 
In practice, prosecutors charged with a task of assessing the appro-
priateness of prosecution are subject to the hierarchical authority 
of the Ministry of Justice, which raises doubts as to its political use 
in some delicate cases.
The French have very little confidence in their institutions. 
In 2016, only 14% of French people trusted political parties, while 77% 
believed that politicians were corrupt 4. This mistrust is worrying 
because people who have the worst image of their government are 
those who want more state intervention: the government is growing 
because of a lack of confidence in it 5.
Above all, although placed at the head of the republican trilogy, 
liberty is not pre-eminent. It is called upon to bow before other re-
quirements such as safety, health, environmental protection, or even 
good feelings, according to an overbidding of legislators and opin-
ions. By wanting to protect some people against themselves, the 
legislator imposes restrictions on everyone’s freedom. This trend is 
not limited to certain lifestyles. It affects all areas: health insurance, 
retirement, housing, transport, and education. Any debate on these 
subjects is fed by budgetary, sociological, and even educational 
arguments. Yet, it ignores freedom which is destined to disappear 
behind the spirit of the moment.
Conclusion
The democratic deficit in France has deep roots. The situation is 
even more serious in that it is a part of a general movement fueled 
by anti-system rhetoric.
The country needs a new phase of democracy. The revitalization 
of parliament, more resources for the judiciary, a separation of the 
state and the press, a state that intervenes less in people’s choices, 
and greater citizen participation in the supervision of politics now 
seem more necessary than ever.
More fundamentally, citizens should realize that the best way 
to protect civil liberties is to limit the scope of the state. The greater 
the temptation to flout the limits of power, the more important it is 
to show scrupulous deference to them.
France is obsessed with its economic decline. However, it should 
also be careful to preserve its rule of law.
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The “new” Finns Party — 
nationalistic policies 
powered by fear?
In Finland as well as in other European countries, the refugee crisis 
has caused a lot of polarization and fears among citizens. Until now, 
Finnish political parties have been rather constructive on the topic 
and refrained themselves from exploiting people’s fears to gain 
political support. The split of the Finns Party may however change 
this status quo.
The nationalist-populist Finns Party became the second biggest 
party in Finnish parliamentary elections 2015 with 38 seats out of 
200. The party gained seats by criticizing the EU, presenting itself 
as an alternative to the establishment and opposing immigration.
The Finns Party has always been a moderate version of its 
European populist counterparts. Within the party, there has always 
been a faction of members who feel that opposing immigration is 
their most important political goal; but for the leaders of the party, 
immigration has never been a top priority.
The election result enabled the party to join the coalition govern-
ment led by the Centre Party and accompanied by the National 
Coalition Party. Within the government the party was forced to 
adjust its policies and make compromises. It has become a moder-
ate coalition partner.
Party split and the governmental crisis
From the standpoint of the Finns Party, the refugee crisis emerged 
in the worst possible time. Even though the coalition tightened Finn-
ish immigration policies, many supporters felt that the party had 
betrayed its promises.
Accompanied with other disappointments, the support of 
the party was cut down to half. Dissatisfaction grew and in 
December 2016 the front man of the anti-immigration wing, MEP 
Jussi Halla-aho stated that he would challenge the long-time 
party leader Timo Soini. A couple of months later, Soini said 
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that he would leave his position after running the party for over 
twenty years.
The party convention was held in June 2017. Several candidates 
ran for the post, but eventually Halla-aho won by a wide margin. 
The transition of power was finalized when all the vice-chairmen 
of the party were replaced with MP’s that supported Halla-aho’s 
policies. Many felt that the party’s position had shifted from centre 
to far-right in one day.
The election result led to a government crisis. The coalition 
partners announced that they could no longer cooperate with 
the party. But the government breakdown was avoided when 
20 moderate members of the Finns Party decided to abandon 
the party. They formed their own parliamentary group, the Blue 
Reform, and stayed in the government.
Exploitation of fear?
The big question is what the renewed Finns Party will bring to 
Finnish politics. Now in opposition, the ideologically unified anti-
immigration right-wing party can freely promote their own agenda 
and exploit the fears that Finnish people have towards immigrants 
and refugees.
According to the survey conducted in March 2017 by the Ministry 
of Interior, a majority of Finnish citizens have strong negative 
attitudes towards asylum seekers. As figure 1 shows, the majority 
feels that refugees entering the country will increase social conflict, 
crime rates and threat of terrorism — less than one in five disagrees. 
The negative sentiments are deeply rooted.
The negativity can also be detected in the social media, where 
vitriolic comments are increasingly common. There are people eager 
to share news stories dealing with crimes committed by refugees 
and it is difficult to find a social media platform dealing with im-
migration issues that is free from inappropriate language and even 
hate speech.
Hate speech within the “new” party
Before the split of the Finns Party, there used to be a rather widely 
shared consensus among politicians that all hate speech is to be 
condemned; but the situation is likely to change.
In 2012, Jussi Halla-aho was convicted of disturbing religious 
worship and of ethnic agitation. Many of his supporters have been 
accused of similar incidents — including the party’s vice chairman 
Teuvo Hakkarainen who was convicted of on-line hate speech in 2017.
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The opinions of Finns on the entry of asylum seekers to their country
Source: The Ministry of Interior 2017
Earlier, the party had somewhat indeterminate, yet negative view 
on these incidents, but now the party is actually ran by men guilty of 
disseminating hate speech. It seems clear that the “new” Finns Party 
has more tolerance for its supporters’ inappropriate language.
It remains to be seen whether the new, nationalistic Finns Party 
will be able to gain support; but the new party will certainly pose 
a challenge to liberal parties promoting openness, human rights and 
equality of citizens regardless of their background.
Dialogue is the key
The simple solution to the challenge posed by the Finns Party would 
be to vigorously oppose their policies and to isolate them; but this 
strategy might prove to be counterproductive. In Sweden, other par-
ties have refused to cooperate with the anti-immigration Swedish 
Democrats and according to some of the latest polls, the party is 
now the second biggest.
People’s fears are real and they should not be neglected. 
Instead of allowing the Finns Party to set the agenda and claim 
the monopoly for discussing problems related to immigration, all re-
sponsible political actors should do their best to reduce polarization. 
This is not done by adjusting policies to a more nationalistic direc-
tion, but by promoting fact-based discussion on the topic and by 
advancing dialogue.
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Censoring of Political Center
Political spectrum
Extremism should not be mixed with epatage in behaviour or with 
a style of political campaigning. Stalin was a modest tempered man 
who spoke very quietly. On the contrary, Timo Soini, who loudly 
promised radical changes in Finnish policies, ended up within deep-
rooted modest political establishment. From purely analytical point 
of view, extremism (i.e. being on the extreme) should simply mean 
the location of a political unit (party, movement, indivdual politician) 
on the graph representing the whole existing political spectrum.
One of the principal laws of statistics is the law of normal distri-
bution. It places the most occuring statistical events into the middle 
of the normal distribution (also known as Gaussian) curve and 
leaves its edges to those that have least number of occurances as-
sociated with them, corresponding to the smaller numerical values.
In this graph, values of “−3,0” and “3,0” on the x-axis represent 
political extremes. As the y-axis represents the probability of the 
occurance of the phenomena (in here between 0 and 0,4), it is 
noteworthy that from the point of view of political PR the title of be-
ing “centrist” (“centre-right” or “centre-left”) implicitly imposes upon 
us the idea that these parties are the most numerous. They bear the 
largest popular support and such, as they are the phenomena that 
covers the central area under the curve of the normal distibution 
graph (Let us say that it is the range of values between +1,5 and −1,5 
on the x-axis.) These “center-parties” are often called “the classical 
political parties” (by those who like them) or “political cartels” (by 
those who do not; Estonian term is “cartel-parties”).
There is also another idelogical implication as well: the term 
“extremism” definitely has negative emotional connotation (like the 
term “populism”, that actually means only “popular support”) and is 
usually ascribed by traditional politicians towards their opponents. 
Although, in relation to political realities, Pepe Grillo and J.-C. 
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Juncker are both extremists (by criteria of euro-federalism) and 
Geert Wilders is a centrist.
The terminology itself suggests that location on the political axis 
(x-axis on the graph) of different political groups and parties can 
be determined in relation to each other — to the right from whom? 
As an example, a party valued as “−1,2” is to the “left” from a party 
valued at “−0,6”, but to the “right” from the party ranked at “−2,4”. 
The numerical values attached to the political postions of diferent 
political actors are of conditional, consensual, and of relative value. 
This determination is definitely a qualitative one and the location 
of the political “centrum” cannot be determined numerically 
(by, for  instance, the number of seats in the parliament, by the rank-
ings in polls or votes on the elections). In other words, the classical 
political “center” is not necessarily the most numerous political 
party and vice versa, the “extreme” might control large amounts 
of popularity (example: Hitler came to power by popular vote).
The location on the political spectrum depends upon the criteri-
on that is used to locate parties on the x-axis. Without that criterion 
we are in an analytical mess — the word “liberal” has lost almost any 
of its European meaning today: having had once designated fiscal 
conservativism and market principles of economy (Adam Smith’s 
Standard Normal Distribution
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“invisible hand” policies), it has been taken over (following American 
style) almost by anybody who has “against the rules” inclinations — 
gay activists and animal rights proponents, nudists and multicultur-
alists, eurocrats and “climate change warriors”.
If we take, as an example, the refugee-issue then we will have 
Merkel (“all of them are welcome”) and Poland (“our refugee 
quota is zero”) as extremes and most of the other EU countries as 
the “center”.
Let us employ, for the sake of the example, some other criterion: 
the issue that divides EU today — the extent of control exercised 
by EC over national sovereignities. One edge of the graph is EC 
(“ sovereignities can be overruled” — look at the conflict of Brussels 
with all Vyshegrad states) and UK stating the opposite (Brexit 
means that soveregnities stand above the EU). Regrading political 
freedoms we may look at Spain (“no rights for peaceful demonstra-
tions” in Catalanyan province) and Sweden (“all political rallies are 
protected speech”) as extremes and most of the other countries 
as the center (“some manifestations of the opinions are to be 
restricted”, like so-called “hate-speech”).
New “normal” in Estonia
Here is the composition of Estonian Parliament, class of 2015 
(I present this case as a sample of the anatomy of a country that 
stands in the political center of modern European polity).
While all other parties represented in 101-member Parliament 
may be described as classical ones, there are two post-modernistic 
newcomers: Estonian Conservative National Party (EKRE, 7 seats, 
marked brown) and Free Party (8 seats, marked violet). Neither of 
them is a centrist party in modernistic sense. EKRE would be (and 
has been!) described by European standard, mainstream, media as 
a right-wing extreme (due to its similarity to True Finns, UKIP, even 
AfD, with one sharp difference — EKRE does not share the latter’s 
pro-Moscow positions as the opposite is true!), but that raises 
a problem — who will be on the extreme left?
Some years ago I would say — nobody. By the fall of 2017 the 
situation has changed: the role of extreme left begun being played 
by one of the classical political parties — the social-democrats, who 
have thus moved from the center-left to the left extreme thereby 
opposing themselves to the new parties on “the right”. Here comes 
a truly new challange for our democracies: the appearance of the 
political “center” that is not the most numerous one anymore (as the 
Gaussian curve had suggested). This is the cause of why classical 
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political parties, as power-houses, start to act as extremists by sup-
pressing the “new center” that is numerically small.
The method of “labelling” (calling the new parties “nationalistic”, 
“hate-mongerers”, etc.) is the most visible, but not the only mani-
festation of “old parties” efforts to censor progressive changes 
on European political landscape.
Free Party is the manifestation of post-modernistic policies 
by its very own constitution — by being rather a confederation of 
communities than a classical political party. If in the case of EKRE 
the political censorship, by political correctness, may be exercised 
(and that is what has been happening — such as against Pepe Grillo, 
True Finns, Austrian Free Party, Geert Wilders, and other progres-
sivist parties and policies) that is not the case of the Free Party 
that fundamentally rests upon the existence of the social media 
that overcomes many barriers of traditional censoring (restricting, 
 denying access, etc) of political agenda.
Estonian Parliament
Government (54)
KE (26)
SDE (15)
IRL (12)
Independent (1)
Opposition (47)
RE (30)
EV (8)
EKRE (7)
Independent (2)
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Happy Nation?
Denmark traditionally has a strong human rights record and has been 
repeatedly ranked as one of the least corrupt countries in the world, 
by the global anti-corruption NGO Transparency International. A small, 
wealthy nation with a high median income and a low level of inequal-
ity, Denmark is often seen as a model democracy within the EU.
Denmark is not, however, immune to the pressures of globaliza-
tion nor to the effects of polarizing new media. In some respects, 
the political and social victories of the past may in fact be causing 
a heightened sense of alarm among many Danes, as they fear losing 
not only their high standard of living, but also the strong social 
and cultural cohesion and sense of community in their once very 
homogenous country.
Democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental human rights are 
not under any obvious or immediate political threat in Denmark. 
There are, however, key areas of society where democratic values 
and ideals, once taken for granted, are no longer universally shared, 
and there are a number of concerning tendencies that, if left un-
checked, may in time evolve into serious threats against the liberal 
democracy. In this short article, I would like to call attention to the 
two of such areas of particular concern: 1) The rise of islamophobia 
2) Insufficient accountability of government ministers and officials to 
the rule of law.
Phobias
Turning first to the rise of xenophobia in general and islamophobia 
in particular, neither of these phenomena are new. Indeed, the 
anti-immigration Danish Peoples Party, currently the second largest 
political party in Denmark, was founded in 1995 following an already 
heated national debate about the perceived dangers of a more 
multicultural society. Since then, anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim 
sentiments have been further inflamed by the long so-called 
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“war on terror” that followed the 9.11 attacks, while most recently 
by the Syrian refugee-crisis and by the series of ISIS-inspired ter-
rorist attacks in Paris, London, Berlin etc.
In a recent Danish poll, 41% of respondents agreed that the 
recent terrorist attacks in Europe had made them more skeptical 
of Muslims in general. Although this tendency was most pronounced 
among older Danes, the move towards increased skepticism of all 
Muslims was surprisingly strong among all age groups. Thisrecent 
rise in general anti-Muslim sentiment has been reflected politically 
in several ways. One such example is the establishment of a new 
political party to the right of the Danish peoples Party. This new 
right-wing party is not yet represented in parliament, but has 
announced its intentions to renounce not only the Dublin treaty 
but also the European treaty on human rights in order to enact new 
anti-immigration and anti-Muslim legislation.
The most serious political consequence of rising islamophobia 
in Denmark, however, is not the rise of new fringe parties or move-
ments, but the effect that anti-Muslim sentiments and fears have 
on the large and established political parties. Recently the largest 
political party in Denmark, the Social Democratic Party, has pro-
posed removing government funding for private Muslim schools 
in Denmark, while retaining government funding for comparable 
Jewish or Catholic private schools. This type of blatant discrimina-
tion is still frequently seen in legislative proposals from large and 
Question: 
Have the recent attacks by islamic ter-
rorists, made you feel more skeptical 
towards or concerned about Muslim 
citizens in general? 
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established political parties. It can be described as either a prob-
lematic response to the difficult problem of integration or simply 
a direct attempt to pander to rising anti-Muslim sentiments in the 
Danish electorate.
In this context, it is worth remembering, that democracy is 
not just about free elections, transparent political decisions or an 
independent judiciary. It is an ideological prerequisite of a modern 
liberal democracy where all citizens are considered equal, and 
are treated as such by the state irrespective of their race, religion, 
gender or sexual preference. This equal treatment of all citizens 
is increasingly under threat in Denmark, as politicians scramble 
to respond to fears of unwanted cultural change and problems 
of cultural and economic integration.
Accountability
The second area of concern that I would like to address, is the prob-
lem of government accountability to the rule of law. This problem 
is perhaps most apparent when Danish government ministers or 
officials act in ways that are legally problematic, but popular among 
either the electorate or the majority of parliament. A recent example 
concerns the Danish minister of integration, who chose to physically 
separate legally married asylum-seekers without individual assess-
ments; in all cases the wives were under 18 years of age. This was 
ostensibly done to combat forced marriages among asylum-seekers 
and was very popular, both in the electorate and among the parlia-
mentary majority. Clearly, it was also very illegal and a breach of the 
European convention on human rights. When opposition parties 
pointed out the illegality of the decision, it was reversed, but no other 
action was taken, since in Denmark initiating an enquiry into the 
actions of a government minister requires a parliamentary majority.
Legal safeguards
In a modern liberal democracy the rule of law must always have 
primacy over the popularity or otherwise of political decisions. 
A combination of national constitutions and European, or UN, 
treaties ensures that human rights and fundamental freedoms are 
secured for all citizens, irrespective of their popularity at any given 
time. It is an essential part of a modern liberal democracy, that it 
contains such legal breaks against majority-decisions, that run 
counter to society’s fundamental values. These breaks certainly 
exist in Denmark, but increasingly pro-government ministers and 
officials are only held accountable only for problematic decisions, 
Rune Christiansen Happy Nation?
if they have a political majority against them. Thus, there is a politi-
cal accountability, but no accountability towards the rule of law.
There is no simple solution to the rise in anti-Muslim sentiment 
caused by terrorism, problems of integration, and cultural shifts. 
However, it is essential that we hold on to our legal safeguards 
against discrimination and ensure that the values of our liberal 
democracy are upheld; especially in regards to vulnerable minori-
ties. To that end, a strong social-liberal response to the two areas 
of concern mentioned above would be to establish greater juridical 
oversight with the government in Denmark and to empower parlia-
mentary minorities consisting of one third of parliament to initiate 
investigations of any potentially illegal actions taken by government 
ministers or officials. This would create greater governmental 
accountability towards the rule of law and would make it harder to 
take potentially popular, but legally and democratically problematic, 
governmental actions that pander to anti-Muslim sentiments in seg-
ments of the population.
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The Ostrich Republic
Is it reasonable to discuss democratic deficits in a country that 
consistently ranks very high in most of the global freedom indexes? 
Is there anything rotten in the case of freedoms? In the past years 
the Czech Republic has hit global headlines with some embarrass-
ing news from the local political scene. Even though it is natural that 
individual fails happen, certain trends are developing and deserve 
further commentary.
Every cloud has a silver lining
The Czech Republic is one of the most independent countries in 
terms of freedom of speech. However, according to the World Press 
Freedom Index that is published every year by Reporters Without 
Borders the Czech Republic dropped from 13th position to 23rd posi-
tion during the past three years. Based on the World Press Freedom 
report, the decline in the rankings was mainly caused by the changes 
in concentration of media ownership happening since 2008.
For instance, there is the explicitly stated example of Andrej 
Babiš who used to be both Deputy Prime Minister and Finance 
Minister, as well as the owner of the two most influential daily news-
papers in the country. Consequently, the law that was supposed to 
combat conflicts of interest and prevent government ministers from 
owning media outlets was adopted in 2016.
On the other hand, centralization of media into few hands trig-
gered an emergence of many new on-line media projects that were 
established by experienced journalists leaving traditional media. They 
positioned themselves as truly independent media that can publish 
without any external pressure. Most of them have already grown up 
into paper outlets. Consequently, variety in choice of information has 
increased tremendously over the past years. One just needs to learn 
how to better understand information labyrinths. Unfortunately, that 
is something most Czechs were not taught at schools.
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May you live in interesting times
There is never lack of interesting events in the Czech Republic. If you 
just got up and there is nothing scandalous in headlines, then you 
are not in the Czech Republic. At certain moments the struggle 
to clear politics from corruption seemed very chaotic. Politicians 
were taken into custody and then released with an apology. One of 
such examples is the case of the former Prime Minister Petr Nečas 
whose political career and government team ended up being raided 
by special security forces coming for his secretary at that time, 
The Market Plurality indicators 
examine the existence and effec-
tiveness of the implementation of 
transparency and disclosure pro-
visions with regard to media own-
ership. In addition, they assess 
the existence and effectiveness of 
regulatory safeguards to prevent 
horizontal and cross-media con-
centration of ownership and the 
role of competition enforcement 
and State aid control in protecting 
media pluralism. Moreover, they 
seek to evaluate the viability of 
the media market under examina-
tion as well as whether and if so, 
to what extent commercial forces, 
including media owners and 
advertisers, influence editorial 
decision-making.
Source: Media Pluralism 
Monitor 2016, Centre for Media 
Pluralism and Media Freedom, 
December 2016
Czech Republic: Market Plurality Area
75%
68% 67%
71%
40%
Transparency 
of ownership
Media ownership 
concentration 
(horizontal)
Cross-media 
concentration of 
ownership and 
compertition 
enforcement
 Commercial 
& owner 
 influence over 
editorial content
Media  
visibility
High Risk 
Medium Risk 
Low Risk
R
is
k 
116 — 117
Czech Republic #freedomofmedia #justicesystem
who currently happens to be his new wife. She was accused, among 
other things, of illegal use of intelligence forces to spy on Prime 
Minister’s wife. The case has not been closed yet and it seems that 
she will be released for lack of evidence.
Even the most famous corruption scandal of the member of the 
Parliament being caught with 7 million CZK (some 270.000 EUR) 
in a wine box has not been resolved yet. The main evidence, tapes 
from his house, was proclaimed as illegally obtained. Despite elec-
tion programs and political events there is an evolving system of 
highly-profiled cases that significantly influence not only elections, 
but also duration of each government. These publicized cases usu-
ally turn out as legally unfounded later on.
The Political Independence indica-
tors assess the existence and 
effectiveness of regulatory safe-
guards against political bias and 
political control over the media 
outlets, news agencies and dis-
tribution networks. They are also 
concerned with the existence and 
effectiveness of self-regulation 
in ensuring editorial independ-
ence. Moreover, they seek to 
evaluate the influence of the State 
(and, more generally, of political 
power) over the functioning of the 
media market and the independ-
ence of public service media.
Source: Media Pluralism 
Monitor 2016, Centre for Media 
Pluralism and Media Freedom, 
December 2016
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Media plays an important role in interpretation of these cases. 
There is no coincidence that the cases are sometimes called 
octopuses, as it is almost impossible to untangle them correctly. 
Leaked information from police files, or sudden discovery of phone 
call tapings, have become a part of daily media routine and a way to 
capitalize most out of the eventful political scene.
It is a common practice to publish names and photos of people 
who are not sentenced yet. Penalty for this law infringement is 
a joke, so it pays off for most of the media. Public is washed by 
footages from court rooms where just another corruption case was 
closed without a sentence or a decision postponed again. The sen-
tence might actually come, but it usually takes years, so public 
loses track of who did what and what was wrong about it. There 
is a persisting feeling that even the judiciary cannot unravel the 
tangle of cronies’ relationships. The missing reform of the system 
of prosecutors does not help with dispelling these concerns, as 
prosecutors subject to the Minister of Interior and political pres-
sures cannot be ruled out.
The thick-skinned
Probably what was described above is typical not only for the Czech 
Republic. Every country has its own scandals and cases that shake 
political scene. The difference between the Czech Republic and 
other countries lies in their citizens’ sensitivity towards these cases. 
Interestingly, these cases do not mean the end of their main actors’ 
political career.
The parliamentary elections that are due in fall can bring many 
surprises. As the stereotype goes, an average Czech usually chuck-
les over political events with a pint of beer in a pub. He goes to vote 
every four years and then buries his head in sand and hopes for the 
best. Nevertheless, situation in the Czech Republic is not caused 
by a systematic fault, but by actions of few individuals. In the end, 
it is about individuals and their sense of responsibility towards their 
position, and citizens’ courage in taking their heads out of sand.
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The Cyprus Problem as a root 
cause of the Republic of Cyprus’ 
democratic woes
The Cyprus Problem is the on-going division between the two main 
communities of the island, Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, 
that has dominated Cyprus’ modern history. It could be argued that 
it has defined the public discourse of the island and the way the 
generations upon generations of Cypriots conceive politics and the 
Republic of Cyprus itself.
Granted its independence in 1960, the Republic of Cyprus was 
set to be a Presidential democracy with a Greek-Cypriot president 
and a Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President; both with a power of veto. 
A similar approach was taken in the cabinet, as well as all branches 
of the governance, with state offices and positions of power being 
distributed on ethnic lines. This approach thought to promote 
a sense of balance in the participation of both communities in the 
state as well as a way to safeguard their rights. This was, at the 
same time, the basis of the state’s checks and balances system, 
essential for any democracy.
Conflict
Consequently, the tensions between the two communities and the 
subsequent withdrawal of the Turkish-Cypriots from state, followed 
by the Turkish invasion which led to the division of the island, dis-
rupted the functionality of the state as well as the checks and bal-
ances which were already in place by the Constitution. This affected 
the functionality of the main branches of the state, fractured the 
pursued balance of the Republic, and most importantly terminated 
the checks placed upon the power of the President, leaving him with 
almost absolute strength in a manner that analysts often describe 
as “elective absolute monarchy”.
Reversals that can be perceived are the direct effects that the 
division has had on the state. Thus, in our exploration of its effects 
on the state, it is equally, if not more important, to explore the 
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‘indirect’ ramifications the division has had on the society and the 
political structure of the Republic. Namely, the way the conflict and 
the ongoing division have affected the Greek-Cypriot community’s 
stance in the public sphere and its consequences.
The conflict with its adverse effects on Cyprus and its people, 
as well as the on-going division, has evidently instilled a sense of 
distrust, and an aversion of one segment of the society towards 
the other community. It has also fuelled and preserved nationalism 
within the Greek-Cypriot community which for many years was rein-
forced by the Republic’s political and educational system, the media, 
and public discourse.
Extremism
This has provided a fertile ground for nationalist and extreme-right 
groups to exert influence upon the political affairs, Greek-Cypriot 
society, and especially the youth. Such groups often base their 
rhetoric on a hard-line approach towards the Cyprus problem and 
use the on-going negotiations to also portray and attract support 
for their xenophobic and ultra-conservative views.
Being in the trenches of the political system or operating as 
sub-groups within established organizations and traditional parties 
Source: Author’s 
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they, for many years, were not visible in their own right. However, 
the growing discontent towards the traditional parties, due to the 
financial crisis, the failings of the state, and growing number of cor-
ruption accusations and convictions of politicians has allowed them 
to gain support making their presence felt. One that can no longer 
be ignored is the extreme-right party of ELAM (National Popular 
Front), associated with Golden Dawn in Greece, that has managed 
to elect two MPs in the national parliament.
Discourse
Besides this, it is important to note the extent to which the Cyprus 
Problem has dominated the public discourse. Since the invasion it 
has become the main and sometimes the sole focus of the political 
system. There is hardly an election in Cyprus (not only Presidential, 
but also a Parliamentary, European, and in some cases even local) 
that does not refer to or even evolve around ‘the national issue’.
As a result other important issues, such as the state’s short-
comings or observance of the almost endemic corruption, are 
often ignored or not sufficiently delved into, contributing to the 
preservation of the government’s deficiencies. Moreover, politicians 
frequently run their election campaigns and attain support by solely 
focusing on their views on the Cyprus instead of making proposals 
related to the office they are running for.
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This is problematic for the political system and the state for 
a variety of reasons. This practice allows election of candidates 
without a clear set of proposals or the skills needed to address the 
issues of the position they are running for. Additionally, important 
aspects of governance and day-to-day problems are not discussed 
or dealt with in the manner that they should be. Therefore, the voters’ 
ability to conceive the issues at hand and vote for a candidate or 
hold him responsible based on his/her views and skills is hindered. 
Furthermore, the Cyprus Problem is a significant criterion for voter’s 
political alignment.
Maturity
These parameters have also acted against the maturity of the 
political debate and the political system since the independence 
of Cyprus in 1960. Political parties have not developed nor have put 
forward proposals as per their ideological conception of the society; 
in other words — the ideology they claim to represent. As a result, 
political parties and their voters/members often exhibit a superficial 
adherence and understanding of their proclaimed ideological views. 
Consequently, voters are often susceptible to populist rhetoric that 
often hijacks important issues. All these lead to relations of interfer-
ence, corruption, and conservatism that keep the country stagnant 
and the democratic deficiencies intact.
Evidently, this exploration of the effects the Cyprus Problem has 
had on the functionality of the democracy can become an endless 
process. Despite the fact that no one can argue against the impor-
tance of the Cyprus Problem and the extent to which a possible 
solution would benefit the island, there is no doubt its effects on the 
day-to-day politics of the Republic cannot be omitted. Not only they 
act as a root cause for the state’s democratic deficiencies, but they 
also raise further obstacles in reunifying the island.
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Warning Signals
3 examples of Croatian democratic deficits represent opportunities 
for open society rational discussion in order to deliver better future. 
Overcoming democratic deficits is an integral part of satisfying 
Copenhagen criteria.
Before going into the problem, we should note the following:
1. We should not analyse complaints on democratic deficit made 
by far left and right populists.
2. It is usually evident that many Croatians are not very motivated 
to discuss domestic problems (with the democratic deficit) 
if other (and more developed) countries and even the EU, have 
at least some similar problems. Then, there is a popular saying: 
why should we be greater than the pope.
It seems that Croatia is finally far away from the democratic 
deficits which appeared very often during the authoritarian period 
(1991—2000). The Croatian President Franjo Tuđman did not care 
much about liberal democratic values and Western standards. 
These are the facts about Croatian heritage regarding democratic 
deficit, no matter how many people disagree with it just because 
of emotional motivation towards the first President.
Since 2000, Croatia has started with its European integration 
process, which included strengthening liberal democratic institu-
tions in politics, administration, market economy and civil society. 
Despite satisfying (almost) all EU accession conditions, democratic 
deficit is still present. We should take a look at certain examples.
1. Problems with overcoming the totalitarian legacies
Many Croatians and political representatives still have favours 
towards the domestic form of Communism or National Social-
ism. “Heroes” should not be criticised for their massive crimes 
against human rights, if not against democracy. If anybody tries 
to revise these post-totalitarian legacies, it is seen as a “betrayal” 
Daniel Hinšt
is president of Centre 
for Public Policy and Eco-
nomic Analysis, Croatian 
free market think tank.
Croatia
#ruleoflaw #humanrights
Daniel Hinšt Warning Signals
or “revisionism”. Communist/socialist-leaning people usually pre-
sented themselves as “progressive” and “civic” minded, while ethnic 
nationalists tend to see themselves as “patriotic” and “Croatian”. 
Lack of liberal democratic education, together with lack of clear 
policy orientation among mainstream political parties, has caused 
this problem. Politics seems to be perceived by many people a con-
flict zone between these two ideological “worldview” trenches. This 
automatically ejects the serious political agenda which aims to push 
delayed structural liberalisation reforms and development of liberal 
democratic institutions.
Referendum 2013  
Votes in favour
Source: Institut Sinergije Znanosti  
i Društva (www.iszd.hr)
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One of possible solutions is to educate people and their politi-
cians to be able to make differences between totalitarian legacies 
and liberal democratic values. Moreover, civic education many help 
young people to develop creative and productive mindset.
2. Constitutional regulation of marriage
Croatia has an act which regulates traditional marriage and the 
other which regulated same-sex civil unions. Fundamentalist 
Catholic civil society groups pushed for 2013 referendum in order 
to regulate traditional marriage. This would automatically prevent 
legalising same-sex marriage. If we take into account different 
opinions on this issue (with almost nobody to advocate marriage 
deregulation), the majority’s referendum decision puts Croatian 
democracy in a problematic position. On the one hand, the decision 
is democratic. On the other hand, it is not liberal democratic since 
the rules allow the referendum on the issue which should be suf-
ficiently regulated by law. From the (progressive) liberal perspective, 
the referendum decision has been criticised as a step backwards, 
against human rights and civil liberties. Classic liberals were arguing 
that any hyper-regulation of marriage is not legitimate and repre-
sents just a new government intervention in our liberties, while the 
constitution should mainly regulate the limited government.
One of the solutions should be to educate people and their politi-
cians that democracy and liberal democracy are not the same and 
that we mostly live in representative democracies, instead of trying 
to copy models of direct democracies. Moreover, people should not 
decide on civil liberties through referendums.
3. Politicians not so willing to respect the constitution
While there is a growing demand to regulate some things by 
constitution, some of its articles have not been respected and 
legally implemented. The Centre for Public Policy and Economic 
Analysis (CEA) has been focused on promoting article 49, which 
clearly guarantees entrepreneurial and market freedoms. Moreover, 
Internal Market freedoms are a central part of the Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union, which practically serves as the 
EU constitution. How is it possible that many politicians, parliamen-
tary representatives and public employees have not been aware of 
their practical duties which must be fully in line with clear principles 
and rules? How is it possible that many laws and bylaws contain 
evident regulatory barriers which harm free market competition 
by protecting particular interests in the name of “public interest”? 
“I vote against” — a clear  
message against consti- 
tutional regulation  
of marriage
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How come some unserious politicians easily propose policies which 
could be identified as illegal? Parliamentarians are not so willing 
to challenge the existing regulations which hamper entrepreneurs. 
On the other hand, the parliament’s regulatory policy mainly serves 
as a default majority’s verification of laws proposed by the executive 
government, without much rational thinking.
One of possible solutions is to educate people and their 
politicians that democracy is not above the rule of law, but rather 
opposite. Moreover, people should find out that massive breaches 
of article 49 are the main causes of the lack of competitiveness and 
growth in Croatia.
These are just 3 examples for discussing the democratic deficit 
in Croatia. They should rather serve as models for detecting con-
crete cases from the past and even the future. Democratic deficits 
in other democratic countries, and even within the EU, should not be 
alibis for Croatia, but rather a warning signal for all sides.
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Democracy in Bulgaria: 
major deficits and challenges
More than a quarter of a century after the beginning of the 
democratic changes in Bulgaria, scholars, journalists, research-
ers, and Bulgarian society in general, continued to ask, “Did we 
succeed in building a real democracy?” and “Whether democratic 
achievements, such as fair and free elections, freedom of speech, 
and the rule of law are sustainable achievements of the 
democratic process?”
These issues are becoming increasingly relevant due to the fact 
that a number of international studies and national studies show 
a retreat from these values and principles, and stress deficits in the 
functioning of key democratic institutions. In this context, three 
areas of negative processes are highlighted and where efforts 
should be concentrated in order to build a sustainable and effective 
democracy in Bulgaria: 1) the election process; 2) the rule of law and 
the fight against corruption; 3) freedom of the media.
Main Challenges to Integrity and Transparency  
in the Election  Process
Studies of a number of Bulgarian and international non-govern-
mental organizations (Transparency International-Bulgaria, OSCE, 
Council of Europe, Bulgarian Association for Fair Elections, Institute 
for Development of the Public Environment) show that over the 
past decade the most important problems of the electoral process 
are: 1) non-transparent funding of election campaigns and ineffec-
tive control; 2) vote buying and controlled vote 3) organizational 
irregularities.
The TI-Bulgaria’s monitoring reports of 2009—2017 give reason 
to evaluate that vote buying and controlled vote are becoming 
increasingly important for the political process, and that the most 
important preconditions for these problems are: 1) the inefficient 
functioning of the parties as effective representatives of voters’ 
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interests — respectively diminishing trust in parties; 2) political par-
ties’ aspirations to access power resources (particularly important 
in elections that provide access to public finances — local elections 
and parliamentary elections); 3) economic problems, poverty and 
social exclusion; 4) the ineffective work of the institutions that 
have been investigating and prosecuting the electoral offenses; 
5) a specific political culture of some social groups and communities 
that tolerates practices such as buying votes and putting pressure 
on the free will of individuals.3
High-level corruption: a major challenge  
to the effective functioning of the institutions
Corruption is the second problem that poses a serious threat to the 
democratic development of the country. All opinion polls conducted 
in recent years show that corruption is among the leading issues 
for Bulgarian citizens.
The Corruption Perceptions Index of Bulgaria for 2016 is 41 points, 
thus positioning the country at 75th place in the global ranking.4 
Thus Bulgaria occupies the last place in the ranking of the new 
Types of Electoral Violations in Bulgaria: 
Trends from 2009 to 2017
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member states of the EU which joined the union after 2004. 
The tendency is especially disturbing in view of the fact that the best 
part of the states from Central and Eastern Europe note a trend 
of relatively solid increase of their indexes, which is an indicator 
of progress in the fight against corruption and modernization 
of institutions.
The comparative data for the index of Bulgaria within the last 
five years demonstrate lack of any progress whatsoever: the index 
of Bulgaria remains far below the critical value of 50 points, which is 
an indicator for a systematic failure to oppose corruption. This com-
parison underlines the acute necessity for a change in the politics of 
counteracting corruption, while in this respect the formal approach 
in the fight against corruption is to be discarded and a clear engage-
ment for profound reforms in the basic institutions within this area 
should be expressed.
Corruption Perceptions Index in Central and 
Eastern Europe (new member states of EU)
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Media environment: Is it possible to guarantee media 
pluralism, transparency of ownership and compliance 
with ethical standards?
Another international study, the World Press Freedom Index of 
Reporters Without Borders, shows a link between corruption and 
another fundamental issue of modern democracy — freedom of the 
media. The 2008 report sets out a conclusion that remains relevant 
today: “Dangers of corruption and political hatred: The other disease 
that eats away at democracies and makes them lose ground in 
the ranking is corruption. The bad example of Bulgaria (59th), still 
last in Europe, serves as a reminder that universal suffrage, media 
pluralism and some constitutional guarantees are not enough to 
ensure effective press freedom. The climate must also favour the 
flow of information and expression of opinions.”5 
The comparative analysis of Bulgarian index in the period 2002 
to 2017 shows that there is a worrying trend — the country collapses 
from 32nd place in 2002 to 109th in 2017:
In Bulgaria, there is a worrying tendency to retreat from freedom 
of speech and to neglect the principles of free and fair journalism, 
due to the following problems: concentration of ownership of the 
media market, lack of transparency on the ownership of some of 
the media (offshore companies), monopolization of the print media 
market (including the distribution), close relations between media 
owners and politicians, and violation of ethical standards.
Although these deficits are not the only problems that Bulgarian 
society faces, we can surely conclude that these are the key deficits 
that have the potential to hinder the democracy in Bulgaria. To over-
come them, we need: 1) an adequate assessment of the factors 
that have the potential to undermine democracy; 2) a meaningful 
program that includes targeted, consistent reform actions; 3) politi-
cal will; 4) integrating the efforts of national institutions, political 
parties and civil society.
Worldwide Press 
Freedom Index:  
Index of Bulgaria6
Year Score Rank
2017 35,01 109th out of 180 countries
2016 34,46 113th out of 180 countries
2008 12,50 59th out of 173 countries
2002 9,75 38th out of 139 countries
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1 In this regard, TI-Bulgaria has been 
operating since 2001, as a result of the 
organization’s research and analysis, 
a number of improvements in legisla-
tion have been made, but the most 
important issue remains the applica-
tion of the rules.
2 “Electoral Process and Politics 
for Prevention of Corruption: Cur-
rent Status and Perspectives for 
Development” (monitoring report on 
the parliamentary elections, held on 
26 March 2017), TI-Bulgaria, Sofia, 
2017 (http://transparency.bg/wp-
content/files/MONITORING_REPORT_
IZBORI_44NS_26.03.2017_TI-BG.pdf).
3 Kashukeeva-Nusheva, Vanya, “Vote 
Buying and Controlled Vote in Bul-
garia”, Vanya Kashukeeva-Nusheva, 
TI-Bulgaria, Sofia, 2015 (http://trans-
parency.bg/wp-content/files/Policy_
Paper_election_24.11.2015_FINAL_I-
net_site.pdf).
4 See the most popular comparative 
survey of TI Corruption Perceptions 
Index: https://www.transparency.org/
news/feature/corruption_percep-
tions_index_2016.
5  https://rsf.org/en/world-press-
freedom-index-2008.
 6 The World Press Freedom 
Index ranks 180 countries according 
to the level of freedom available to 
journalists. The colour categories are 
assigned as follows: good (white — 
from 0 to 15 points), fairly good (yel-
low — from 15.01 to 25 points), problem-
atic (orange — from 25.01 to 35 points), 
bad (red — from 35.01 to 55 points) 
and very bad (black — from 55.01 
to 100 points). Sources: https://rsf.org/
en/ranking/2017, https://rsf.org/en/
ranking/2016, https://rsf.org/en/world-
press-freedom-index-2008, https://
rsf.org/en/reporters-without-borders-
publishes-first-worldwide-press-free-
dom-index-october-2002.
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There is a worrying tendency 
to retreat from freedom of 
speech and to neglect the 
principles of free and fair 
journalism, due to the following 
problems: concentration of 
ownership of the media market, 
lack of transparency on the 
ownership of some of the media, 
monopolization of the print 
media market, close relations 
between media owners and 
politicians, and violation 
of ethical standards.
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Particracy in Action
The ‘Democracy Index’ of The Economist is a snapshot of the state of 
democracy worldwide. It is based on five distinct categories: electoral 
process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functionality of government, 
political participation, and political culture. Each country is scored 
on a range of indicators within these categories and gets classified 
as one of four types of regime: full democracy, flawed democracy, 
hybrid regime, or authoritarian regime. Only those countries with 
an overall score of more than 8 are called ‘full democracy’.
“To be (elected), or not to be”
Belgium scores 7,77 and ranks as 35th in their most recent list (2016). 
Thus, it can be described as ‘flawed democracy’. This is rather disap-
pointing result, because all of the Belgium’s neighbouring countries 
do better: Luxemburg (11th), Netherlands (12th), Germany (13th), and 
France (24th). When analysing the overall score, the categories of 
political participation (5/10) and political culture (6,88/10) are the 
weakest points in the Belgian political system of a liberal democracy.
In a liberal democracy the ultimate decision-making power lies 
with people, within the boundaries of individual civil rights and liber-
ties. Citizens delegate their power to representatives and hold them 
accountable through elections. Those representatives, at their turn, 
delegate their power to an executive government and hold them 
accountable in parliament on behalf of the citizens. Both, delegation 
and accountability are flip sides of the same coin.
The importance of elections cannot be underestimated. It plays 
a pivotal role in the healthy functionality of every liberal democracy. 
Elections are the most equitable instrument of political participation. 
The threshold to participate in elections is lower than in any other 
instrument of political engagement. Moreover, elections are by far 
the most popular instrument of political participation, even in times 
of (relatively) low turn up rates.
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Belgian electoral surrealism
Yet there are some evident deficiencies in the way elections are 
organized in Belgium. The popular vote is currently undervalued 
by several electoral rules and procedures. That symbolizes the 
dominant position of political parties (and their leadership), rather 
than the impact and freedom of individual citizens or politicians. 
Belgium is, therefore, often categorized as a “particracy” in the 
scholarly literature.
The system of list votes nicely illustrates this democratic deficit. 
By means of a list vote the voter agrees with the order of the can-
didate list. Those list votes are then distributed among candidates 
who did not gather enough personal votes to be elected directly. 
This distribution starts at the top of the list. That means that the 
place on the main list strongly determines the chances to be voted 
(or not) for the parliament: the higher on the list, the more likely to 
be elected (and vice versa).
The same problematic logic works in the system of successors. 
For example, what if a member of parliament resigns to become 
a minister? Today, the seat goes to the first successor. The person 
is placed once again on this lucrative successor list by the party 
leadership. He, most of the times, would get much less votes than 
candidates on the main list. Yet this event makes him jump past 
them. It is almost like getting a priority boarding pass for an express 
lane to parliament, handed out by the party leadership.
Ties that bind
As a result the voter will not always get the representative he or she 
has chosen, nor even the representative with the most individual 
votes behind his or her name. To a large extent the party’s leader-
ship decides who gets elected in parliament. In addition, the citizens 
can hardly reward or punish individual representatives, but only 
political parties at an aggregated level. The golden rule of elections 
“to kick out the rascals or not” has been seriously weakened.
These forms of “particracy” tend to further paralyze the func-
tionality of the representatives themselves. They have to support 
and stay in favour of the party’s leadership that takes decisions on 
the electoral lists. By eliminating the effect of the list votes and the 
successor system, representatives will be elected to a larger extent 
for their own merit and support. The increase of personal mandate 
from the citizens would give them a welcomed independence.
The greater extent of independence in a stance of representa-
tives from political parties, and from the executive government, 
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is vital in upgrading the parliament as a legislative power and 
a watchdog on behalf of the citizens. It is an antidote for the growing 
alienation between citizens and politicians. The neutralization of the 
list votes and the removal of the successors may seem as a merely 
technical tinkering of the electoral legislation, but it is essential in 
the struggle for more democracy and less “particracy”.
Butterfly effect
The current electoral system makes “democratic victims” and it is 
not just a peripheral phenomenon. In the Belgian Chamber of Rep-
resentatives, 14 members have a seat at the expense of candidates 
who enjoyed more personal support from the voters. In the Flemish 
Parliament it is 11 members. In short, that accounts for almost 10% 
of the representatives.
The impact on the political system is nevertheless more broad 
and pernicious. The implicit pressure to comply and follow the 
line of the party’s leadership and executive government weakens 
the firm and independent stance of representatives. In the long 
run it fatigues the belief of citizens in the well-being of the parlia-
mentary democracy. As said before, these electoral deficiencies 
are emblematic for the wider lack of political participation and the 
inward-looking political culture in Belgium. The individual citizen has 
too little decision-making power and the political party leadership 
has too much.
The defenders of the list vote and successors system argue 
that it is necessary to guarantee a good mix between old and new 
representatives, between popularity and expertise. They fear that 
elections will be reduced to a popularity contest, where young 
talents or technical backbenchers stand no chance. Although this 
may be a legitimate concern, the list vote and successor system 
seem like a cure that is worse than the disease.
Therefore, we propose to maintain the list vote, but to neutralize 
its effect. Let it count only for the number of seats a party gets. 
A determination of who exactly will occupy these seats will depend 
entirely on the personal votes of a candidate (regardless of their 
place on the list). A party’s leadership may still send an important 
signal by giving young talents or hardworking backbenchers 
a prominent place on the list or by visibly involving them in the 
 election campaign. At the end it is up to the voters to decide 
whether they follow the advice of the party’s leadership or not. 
After all, everyone deserves a fair and equal chance of being elected 
in parliament.
Tom Willems Particracy in Action
Engaging citizens
The list vote and successor system are clear examples of the strong 
position of political parties (and their leadership) in Belgium, at the 
expense of the citizens. This “particracy” is of course a much wider 
phenomenon that encompasses more than just some electoral 
deficiencies. There are other illustrations, like a politicized top-level 
bureaucracy or large ministerial cabinets. It is a way of doing politics. 
It is the part of an outdated political culture, which lacks openness 
and citizen participation. That helps to explain why Belgium is 
a laggard in the ‘Democracy Index’ in The Economist. Belgium is in 
need of a profound political reform to give more decision-making 
power to its citizens: by reforming the electoral system, by updating 
parliamentary activities, by using referenda at regional and national 
levels, by experimenting in cities with new democratic tools such as 
citizen budgets.
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Quo Vadis Austria?
By most standards, Austria’s democratic credentials are sufficient 
to warrant a position at the top of the rankings. Regardless 
of whether you take Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI), where Austria ranks #16 out of 176 countries 
or Freedom House’s landmark report on Freedom in the World, 
Austria fares well.
A peak beneath the shiny surface
Yet, these rankings only show surface of the real situation. Once 
you remove the make-up, the distinct features of clear democratic 
deficits become painfully visible. As the Dutch journalist Caroline 
de Gruyter once wrote in the excellent article about Austria: 
“The eternal coalition [between conservatives and social democrats, 
who ruled Austria almost without interruption since World War II] 
makes Austria a rather corrupt country in many senses. Austrian 
syndicates never go on strike — but they have one of the most 
generous social welfare systems in Europe. Corruption scandals 
involving (former) politicians erupt regularly, leading to court cases 
and convictions. The cleanup of banks in Austria is slower than in 
other countries because banks are full of political appointees who 
enjoy protection. In Austria, corruption doesn’t involve paying bribes 
for drivers’ licenses or birth certificates. But for certain jobs, it helps 
to be a member of a particular political party. The Western-led 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development regularly 
urges Austria to improve transparency.” 1
As of 2017, it is still true that you only stand a very, very small 
chance of becoming Headmaster of a high school if you are not affil-
iated with either the conservatives or the social democrats. And yes, 
while we do not pay bribes to the police, there is a lot of high level 
corruption with indictments and court sentences against former 
ministers (former finance minister Karl-Heinz Grasser and former 
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minister of the interior Ernst Strasser being the most prominent 
examples). Political protection for those with powerful friends is still 
rampant. A recent boat accident involving a well-connected media 
manager highlighted that the Minister of the Interior still uses his 
direct influence to restrict the investigations of the police.
Austria’s democratic deficits are most startling if you compare 
the Austrian situation with the neighboring countries of Germany 
or Switzerland. In Germany, a politician who is accused of wrong 
doing will step down due to public pressure, in hopes of getting 
a second chance after a couple of years. Former German minister of 
the Economy, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, is a prominent example. 
While he resigned, as the result of a plagiarism scandal linked to his 
PhD, his conservative Austrian colleague, Johannes Hahn, declined 
to do anything of the like, despite being accused of the same 
offence with similar evidence. Johannes Hahn is still firmly in his 
position as the Austrian Commissioner in Brussels. In Austria, this 
is called “aussitzen”. Literally, you try to maintain your position for 
as long as can, until public outcry eventually subsides. This is seen 
as a sign of strength; the population accepts this kind of behavior 
as it has never changed since the Habsburg era.
The media, at the heart of the dark side
Out of all democratic deficits in Austria, one is looming much larger 
than all the others: the media. Austria’s biggest newspaper, the 
Kronen Zeitung, reaches almost 40% of the Austrian electorate. In 
a fine example of its political clout, the Kronen Zeitung supported 
the independent list of a hitherto almost unknown MEP’s for the 
European Parliament elections of 2009. The candidate, Hans-Peter 
Martin, gained 18% of the Austrian votes. Approximately 70% of his 
voters were reading the Kronen Zeitung, and close to 30% of the 
newspaper readers voted for him. Austrian politicians are obviously 
very aware of this, and social democrats went as far as announcing 
substantial policy changes in the letter to the editor of the Kronen 
Zeitung instead of consulting their party members or boards.
One might say that this is nothing out of the ordinary for 
a  powerful media house. Possibly so, if one does not mention the 
advertising business. On a per capita basis, Austria has second high-
est level of public subsidies for political parties in the whole world. 
It is about several hundred million Euros, which is a lot of money 
for a small country with 8 million inhabitants. The Austrian govern-
ment spends as much as the German government for the country 
10 times of its size 2, on newspaper advertisements.
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As an example: in the run-up to the regional elections for the 
state (and city of Vienna) in 2015, political parties and public bodies 
controlled by their respective parties spent over 15 million Euros 
on advertisements in daily newspapers. 3 In 70 days only. The lion’s 
share of these advertisements went to three boulevard newspapers, 
Kronen Zeitung, Oesterreich and Heute, with over 3 million Euros 
each. Heute is a free newspaper that would be unable to survive 
without political ads. In turn, their reporting usually favors those 
who finance it through their advertisements. Ironically, Heute is 
managed by Eva Dichand, wife of the editor of Kronen Zeitung, 
Christoph Dichand.
While dozens of journalists have tried to establish some 
evidence to prove this strategy of “buying the media”, no one was 
able to prove it yet. However, no one within the political circles of 
Vienna would doubt the link between some of the political parties 
and the media. It is more than just currying favors, it is a symbiosis. 
One would not be able to survive without the other.
The way forward
A healthy and independent media scene cannot and should not be 
mandated politically. It can only come through initiatives from the 
media sector. While the Swiss newspaper Neue Zuercher Zeitung 
has made an ultimately unsuccessful foray into the Austrian media 
scene, there is a new project coming up: Quo Vadis Veritas, an initia-
tive financed by Austrian billionaire and owner of Red Bull, Dietrich 
Mateschitz. Time will tell.
1 http://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/11/05/
austrian-acrobatics-in-europe-
pub-57137    
2 https://www.dossier.at/dossiers/in-
serate/neunmal-teurer-informiert  
3 https://www.dossier.at/dossiers/
inserate/das-inseraterennen-zur-wien-
wahl-welche-zeitung-bekommt-die-
meisten-inserate-von-parteien-und-
oeffentlicher-hand    
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Epilogue
I have presented to you the European Atlas of Democratic Deficit. 
I hope that you have had an enjoyable, educative and intellectually 
entertaining read. I am convinced that some of the texts have been 
startling to you and helped you look at the challenges faced by Eu-
rope from a fresh perspective, and even from 28 new perspectives.
While compiling the Atlas, my objective was not to depress the 
readers but rather to share my own pessimistic view on the future. 
I did not intend to create a “black book of Europe.” Despite the 
title, where the key words are “democratic deficit,” I did not wish 
to present everything that is wrong about each of the countries. 
My goal was to prepare a true atlas showing the multifaceted nature 
of and the challenges faced by the EU countries as well as to outline 
the existing issues and indicate possible solutions.
What makes up the Atlas is 28 countries, 31 authors and one 
Union. The Union with all its divergence but also a community of 
democracy and problem patterns easy to point out. The authors 
commenting, from the liberal perspective, on the social, political and 
economic reality surrounding them represent various environments, 
professions and groups of interest. They include MPs, NGO activists, 
scientists and journalists. Some of them represent political parties 
or think tanks, others are independent experts. I asked each of them 
to present a critical view on one country — a country where they 
were born, live or simply such that they feel connected to. Each of 
the authors was free to choose the subject and form of their essay. 
This resulted in a wide range of topics touched upon: from hate 
speech to gaps in the electoral system, from residential difficulties 
to local authorities, from discrimination against the Roma to au-
thoritarian ambitions of governments. The authors suggest different 
solutions — some of them may come across as startling or even pe-
culiar from the perspective of another country’s citizen. But this is 
the beauty of the Atlas — it has the potential to trigger a discussion 
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among liberals all over Europe, to serve as an opportunity to learn 
from each other and to look for solutions hand in hand.
Even though the authors, unaware of the topics of the remaining 
essays, wrote about a completely different topic each, we may easily 
indicate some general subjects that are present in the majority of 
the texts. If I were to indicate the most important one having read 
the entire Atlas, I would point at the rise of nationalism and pop-
ulism in Europe. Animosity towards foreigners, hate crimes, growing 
support of radical and xenophobic political groups — these are chal-
lenges present in most of the European countries and communities. 
North to South, East to West. The authors from the so-called “old 
Union”-countries stress the need to fight to protect liberal values, 
which have been the most endangered since WW2. In texts written 
by authors coming from the Central and Eastern Europe, you can 
feel the longing for the times when their countries were liberal 
reform pioneers and set the example for the rest of the world. 
Virtually, these two voices are two sides of the same coin and they 
both express nostalgia for the years of constant growth in the spirit 
of liberalism, democracy, freedom and definitely pro-European 
philosophy. Beyond any doubt, we are living at a time of struggle 
not only to further sustain European integration understood as 
continuous pursuit of closer cooperation within the Union but also 
to maintain the success built over the past decades. As a result of 
consecutive crises that hit Europe, we lost our way again. We were 
robbed of our compass and the initiative was taken by those who 
want to drift aimlessly, disregarding any dangers, rocks and shoals 
on our course. The Atlas features numerous suggestions on how to 
win back the initiative and readjust the lost course.
Together? What does it mean today? After all, the United King-
dom is just about to fade away from the Union’s map. That is why 
the issue of Brexit could not be included in this Atlas. We devoted 
additional pages to the subject as an extraordinary case, typical of 
the UK and, at the same time, of immense importance to the func-
tioning and a (possible) reform of the whole Community. Without 
understanding the reasons for Brexit and learning our lesson from 
it, it will be impossible for the liberals to take over the initiative and 
follow a new course heading towards a strong Union. Brexit has 
become a prism which the entire Atlas should be read through.
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The European Union is split ting 
into two universes — one consisting 
of societies  profi ting from EU mem-
bership, economic growth,  scientifi c 
and technological development, 
and multicultural experiences 
 offered by EU cities and another 
one composed of societies that are 
economically deprived, do not feel 
that their opinions are heard, and 
feel threatened by fast globalization 
and constant acceleration of mobil-
ity of people and information. 
Neža Kogovšek Šalamon
The role of atlases has always been to bring faraway 
lands closer to people. Those curious of the world and 
the nature of remote countries were the ones to reach 
for the atlases. European Atlas of Democratic Deﬁ cit is 
to play the same role. Its function is to present the chal-
lenges faced by particular EU countries and communities. 
Also such challenges that are not obvious and such that 
are not covered in the media for they are too complex 
or too “ typical” of a single country. The role of the Atlas 
is to present such topics, even if niche, to the readers 
from all over Europe. The Atlas is supposed to become 
a source of knowledge about internal problems each 
country is struggling with, including some diffi  culties we 
know nothing about because they are never covered in the 
press or on the news online for they are not hot enough 
to att ract a large number of readers. But aft er all those 
challenges are essential pieces of the complicated puzzle 
called the European Union and without them, no picture 
is complete and no key  reform will be possible.
from the Epilogue
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